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Human rights morality and law represent an authoritative way to challenge 
systems of oppression that can have a deleterious impact on people’s mental 
health. Clinical psychology and human rights uphold similar underlying 
principles such as dignity, respect and equality. Clinical psychologists often 
work with individuals who have experienced, and continue to experience, 
human rights violations. However, the individualising technologies of the 
profession continue to be criticised for not challenging abuses of power and the 
perpetuation of social inequalities.  
 
This research aimed to critically investigate the historical conditions that have 
given rise to the relationship between clinical psychology and human rights. 
Documents relating to the professional practice of clinical psychologists in the 
United Kingdom were analysed using thematic analysis underpinned by critical 
realism. These findings were incorporated into a three-tiered framework of 
macro, meso and micro influences.  
 
Analysis showed that the few explicit references to human rights in the 
documents relating to the practice of clinical psychology were not sustained or 
developed into later documents. Most often appeals to human rights were 
vague and there was no discussion about professional obligations to integrate 
standards in everyday practice, service design or policy. In addition, these 
standards only upheld a narrow range of human rights which limited the ethical 
vision of the profession as it was developing. This pattern of engagement with 
human rights across the history of clinical psychology was explored by 
reference to transhistorical, global, national and professional pressures. The 
research concludes by exploring the implications for a renewed clinical 
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As long as the moral authority of the scientific community remains 
unchallenged from within, history will be seen either as irrelevant, or as 
an occasion for celebration. It is when that authority becomes 
questionable, when the professional community is divided in some 
profound way, that a critical disciplinary history has a significant 
contribution to make. (Danziger, 1994, p. 478) 
 
The passage above highlights the orientation of this study. This history of 
clinical psychology is critical in order to generate renewed ideas about a 
possible future for the profession. Although clinical psychology is a relatively 
young disciplinary body of knowledge and practice (Hall, Pilgrim & Turpin, 
2015), the world is rapidly changing in response to a growing awareness about 
the relationship between mental health and justice (Rose, 2019). Commitments 
by influential global actors such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), the 
Movement for Global Mental Health and World Bank have meant that mental 
health is emerging at the international level as a human development imperative 
(United Nations [UN], 2017). The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
aimed to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being as important for realising 
the human right to health (UN, 2015). The protection of people’s human rights is 
viewed as being fundamental to promote and preserve mental health (Dudley, 
Silove & Gale, 2012). Increasingly, mental health and human rights are seen as 
universally valued outcomes and possibly the twin headline projects of 
modernity (Dudley et al., 2012). However, historically, people with mental health 
difficulties have been subject to inequalities associated with the violation of 
fundamental human rights (Kelly, 2016, UN, 2017). Compared to people without 
such difficulties, they die earlier (Ventriglio, Gentile, Stella & Bellomo, 2015), 
experience extreme poverty (Murali & Oyebode, 2004) and face discrimination 
in clinical and social domains (Kurs & Grinshpoon, 2017). This global picture of 
systematic and widespread injustice has been described as a moral failing of 
humanity (Kleinman, 2009).  
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In the United Kingdom (UK), the relationship between mental health and human 
rights cuts across law, national policy and local practices. For example, mental 
health legislation in England only meets 55.4% of the human rights standards 
established by the WHO for reviewing domestic law (Kelly, 2016). Kelly (2016) 
has argued that the legislation that complies least with the WHO standards 
relates to the economic and social rights of those deemed to have mental health 
disorders. Improving mental health and well-being is increasingly prioritised in a 
range of such proposals by governments, hospitals, schools, employers and 
charities (Alexandrova, 2018). At the same time, however, the proliferation of 
policies regarding mental health can also be characterised by a relative silence 
about its relationship to wider concerns relating to human rights. A prominent 
example of this is evident in the current Government’s Green Paper entitled 
Transforming Children and Young People’s Mental Health Provision (England 
and Wales Department of Health and Social Care and Department for 
Education, 2017). The social determinants of mental health were not addressed 
in the original draft and, instead, the policy proposals focused solely on 
improving access to treatment. However, that focus on services did not extend 
to the human rights of those accessing treatment. Those working in mental 
health services acknowledge the threats to civil liberties and human rights, and 
the iatrogenic effects of supposed mental health care (Kinderman, 2014; 
Szmulker, 2018). These concerns include the disproportionate number of 
people from black and minority ethnic groups held under section (Singh, 
Greenwood, White & Churchill, 2007) to the effectiveness of interventions for 
psychosocial difficulties relating to poverty, urbanicity and childhood adversity 
(Pilgrim, 2018).  
 
The current study will explore how clinical psychology has engaged with these 
concerns about human rights and mental health. Human rights offer a particular 
way of thinking about the ethical, political and legal dimensions of both mental 
health and the profession of clinical psychology. This introduction will explore 
the nature of this relationship by surveying the history, theory and dilemmas 






1.2. Human Rights 
 
Human rights are fundamentally moral principles that aim to protect people from 
political, legal and social injustice (Nickel, 1987). They belong to everyone by 
virtue of being human and express people’s deepest interests in freedom and 
safety (UN, 1948). Raz (2010) argued that a human right arises when a 
universal human interest is sufficient to justify imposing correlative duties on 
others. Legal frameworks have developed to codify a number of these moral 
obligations that are owed to other people (Tasioulas, 2010). Examples of 
human rights include the right to a fair trial, the right to freedom from torture 
(mental or physical) inhuman or degrading treatment and the right to the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health.  
 
1.2.1. Grounds for Human Rights  
This section will explore how philosophers and political theorists have sought to 
establish a theoretical basis for claims that people make for human rights. 
Human rights have become increasingly prominent in domestic and 
international discourse (Sen, 1999). However, they are sometimes viewed as 
rhetorically powerful but lacking in substance (Posner, 2008). The inherent 
dignity of the human person is mentioned in the preamble to a number of 
central human rights instruments (Tasioulas, 2013). A recognition of this dignity 
is often presented as the basis for the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family (UN, 1948). However, there is no sustained 
discussion in these instruments about the foundational assumptions of human 
rights in moral and political thought.  
 
One view is that human rights are primarily established through the creation and 
enactment of laws. This argument is responsive to the intuitive line of reasoning 
that rights without a legal duty are at best aspirational and at worst empty 
(Bentham, 1792/1843). However, grounding human rights in legal institutions 
does not do justice to the ways in which they have meaning in people’s lives. 
Sen (2006), for example, has argued that social monitoring and activist support 
by groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch can serve 
to advance unacknowledged human rights. However, advocating for human 
rights does not necessarily mean seeing them as embryonic legal claims. Sen 
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(2006) contended that the Declaration on the Right to Development in 1986 was 
motivated by the idea that “the ethical force of human rights is made more 
powerful in practice through giving it a high-profile social recognition and an 
acknowledged status, even when no enforcement is instituted” (p. 2919). In fact, 
sometimes making human rights legally enforceable can have unwanted 
consequences. Ferraz (2009) has shown that making the right to health 
justiciable in Brazilian courts has led to a transfer of health resources away from 
poorer groups because wealthier people can afford the cost of enforcing their 
legal right to health.  
 
Tasioulas (2012) has outlined an alternative conception of human rights as 
primarily ethical claims, grounded in universal human interests and human 
dignity. On this view, human rights mark the threshold at which each individual’s 
interest generates correlative obligations on others to promote and protect 
those interests. Individual human rights serve a number of universal interests of 
the putative right-holder (Tasioulas, 2012). For example, the human right to 
health serves one’s interest in health but also other interests that health enables 
such as forming friendships and having the freedom to achieve goals (Tasioulas 
& Vayena, 2016). However, many human interests are insufficient to generate a 
correlative duty on others for their fulfilment. For example, it would advance the 
interests of a patient in the advanced stages of renal failure to have a 
transplanted kidney (Neier, 2006), but it does not follow that the patient has a 
human right to someone else’s kidney. Tasioulas (2012) argued that universal 
human interests must operate in cohort with each person’s inherent dignity, 
such one that person’s interests cannot be traded off against another’s. While it 
is possible to advance the interest of someone experiencing organ failure 
through donation, the correlative duty is too burdensome for any duty-bearer to 
fulfil. Therefore, a wrong is not necessarily committed by impairing, or leaving 
unpromoted, another person’s interests (Tasioulas & Vayena, 2016). An 
advantage for clinical psychologists of viewing human rights as primarily ethical 
claims is that it recognises how they can operate at the everyday level of 
ordinary citizens and can inspire activism and criticism outside the formal 





1.2.2. The Emergence of Human Rights 
The different contexts in which human rights emerged, and how they came to 
gain international prominence, has been the focus of significant disagreement 
(Alston, 2013). Ishay (2004) has argued that human rights discourse can be 
discerned in the great texts of many ancient civilisations and world religions 
from the Code of Hammurabi to the Analects of Confucius. A western vision of 
human rights came to dominate global affairs because distinct humanistic 
elements that developed over time were revealed as the best form of 
governance (Ishay, 2004). This linear history seeks to justify human rights 
through an appeal to the progressive refinement of its norms in a succession 
legal and constitutional reforms (Alston, 2013). However, it may be 
anachronistic to conclude that these early laws and treaties contain elements 
that are continuous with human rights. Dudley et al. (2012) argued that it is 
mistaken to identify a concern for human rights in policies that are morally 
congenial. These laws were often responses to local injustices and do not claim 
to apply universally (Klug, 2015). In addition, many of them were not based on 
equality for all people in virtue of their humanity and arguably continued to 
reproduce various class inequalities. 
 
Tierney (2004) argued that jurists, particularly church lawyers, played a crucial 
role in developing the modern language of human rights. The twelfth century 
marked a renaissance in religious life, especially relating to the individual 
domains of assessing guilt, consent to marriage and scrutiny of one’s 
conscience (Tierney, 2004). These individual concerns arose alongside intense 
and elaborate discussions about rights and liberties. Traditionally, the natural 
right designated an objective share in material or social goods, reflecting the 
state of the moral human world and not the isolated soul (Fleischacker, 2005). 
However, the twelfth century canonists, in trying to develop a universal structure 
of jurisprudence for the church, recognised that the term natural right was used 
in different ways across religious texts (Tierney, 2004). Sometimes it referred to 
an objective view of the moral human world but, at other times, its usage 
designated a more subjective sense as a power, force or ability inhering in the 
individual. This primarily meant an ability to discern the right thing to do through 




Once the old concept of natural right was defined in this subjective way 
the argument could easily lead to the rightful rules of conduct prescribed 
by natural law or to the licit claims and powers inhering in individuals that 
we call natural rights. Soon the canonists did begin to argue in this way 
and to specify some such rights (Tierney, 2004, p. 6).  
 
By the fourteenth century some natural rights were recognised such as the 
rights of the poor to basic necessities, the right to defend oneself in a court of 
law and the rights of those who were not Christian. In migrating from a divinely 
ordained objective position in the social order, to a subjective power of the 
individual, natural rights became discoverable psychological properties 
discerned through practical reasoning (Stenner, 2004). From here, other 
notable treaties that laid the platform for human rights were drawn up including 
the English Bill of Rights in 1689, the French Declaration on the Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen in 1789 and the US Declaration of Independence in 1776.  
 
The universalism that is distinctive of human rights is said to have arisen 
following the end of the Second World War and the vivid depictions of the 
liberation of the Nazi death camps (Dudley et al., 2012). These atrocities and 
the subsequent Nuremburg trials shockingly demonstrated the consequences of 
racist and nationalist ideologies (Utley, 1992). The UN was established in 1945 
in order to protect succeeding generations from the scourge of war which had 
brought untold sorrow to mankind (UN, 1945). A United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights was established in 1946. The committee met for the first time in 
January 1947 and appointed a task force, chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, that 
drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The subsequent 
adoption of the UDHR sought to establish internationally recognised human 
rights norms and institutions to promote international peace and security over 
the globe (UN, 1948).  
 
1.2.3. Key International and Regional Human Rights Instruments 
The catalogue of human rights now consists of approximately 50 core normative 
propositions outlined in the founding instruments of the UN (Alston, 1991). 
These were expanded by further specialised UN treaties, a half-dozen regional 
human rights treaties, and hundreds of international norms in the areas of 
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labour, refugees, armed conflict and health (Marks, 2013). This collection of 
human rights law is enriched by declarations, public reasoning and activism 
(Marks, 2013). 
 
The 30 items canonised in the UDHR range from political and civil rights to 
social, cultural and economic rights. Alston and Goodman (2013) have noted 
that the intention to further develop the UDHR into a single and comprehensive 
legally binding convention was controversial from the start. Some communist 
countries objected that the social, cultural and economic rights outlined in the 
UDHR were too minimal (Alston & Goodman, 2013). A number of factors, 
including the Cold War, slowed progress and the United States began to qualify 
its commitment to the concept of universal human rights. As a consequence, 
the decision was taken to codify the rights enshrined in the UDHR through two 
principal treaties. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) were approved in 1966. The ICCPR guarantees protections 
covering areas such as the individual’s physical integrity, procedural fairness, 
equal protection, political freedoms and the right to political participation. The 
ICESCR aims to secure human rights to education, food, housing and health. 
 
There are questions about whether certain rights have been privileged in these 
treaties. Only the human rights enshrined in the ICESCR are subject to 
progressive realisation, the obligation that a state must do its utmost to promote 
and preserve these rights to the full extent of its available resources. Civil and 
political liberties are not subject to progressive realisation even though it takes 
financial resources to promote and protect some of those norms such as the 
right to a fair trial and recognition before the law. Indeed, the preamble to the 
ICESCR states that the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear 
and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may 
enjoy economic, social and cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights. 
Since the 1970s, the debate has involved important considerations between the 
global north and south. These include claims that developing countries should 
not be held to the same standards and that respect for human rights by poorer 
states must be linked to international aid, trade and other concessions (Hunt, 
2006). Hunt (2006) has argued that the decline of communism and widespread 
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embrace of free-market capitalism within globalisation has meant that 
economic, social and cultural rights will remain controversial and that their 
status will have important implications for other aspects of human rights law.  
 
Multilateral human rights treaties have further developed the content of the 
rights that were expressed in a more condensed manner in the two covenants 
(Alston & Goodman, 2013). It has been argued that all seven of these 
international conventions have a bearing on mental health and well-being 
(Patel, in press). While there have been appeals for a specific treaty for people 
with mental health difficulties (Plumb, 2015), the most recent treaty relevant to 
mental health is the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD). It came into force in 2008 and was ratified by the UK in 2009. The UN 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which monitors how the 
convention is being put into practice locally, reviewed the UK in August 
2017. The UN Committee expressed concern that adequate provisions were not 
being taken to apply the principles of the convention to all areas of life, that 
disabled people were not sufficiently involved in decision-making and that more 
could be done to embed the social model of disability into practice (UN, 2017).  
 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) entered into force in 1953. It has developed extensive 
human rights jurisprudence which applies to almost a quarter of the nations in 
the world (Alston & Goodman, 2013). The Human Rights Act (HRA) 
incorporated the rights from the ECHR into UK domestic law in 1998, affording 
a legal mechanism for breaches of the ECHR in UK courts. Public authorities, 
such as the NHS and its employees (including clinical psychologists), are seen 
as duty bearers and responsible for upholding the rights of service users, or 
rights bearers (HRA, 1998). It is questionable whether the ECHR and the HRA 
have been successful in protecting socio-economic rights to health, social care 
and housing at a time of increasing privatisation of public services (Palmer, 
2007). Other important legal frameworks relevant to clinical psychologists in the 
UK include the Mental Health Act 1983, amended 2007, and the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 which are apparently predicated on human rights principles 
(Greenhill & Golding, 2018). However, Szmukler (2018) has argued that overall 
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legislation in the UK does little to resolve the historical tensions between 
medical paternalism and patient self-determination.  
 
1.2.4. Contesting Human Rights 
Moyn (2010) has challenged the conclusion that human rights gained moral 
ascendency shortly following the end of the war. He alleged that the Holocaust 
played a small role in post war debates about human rights, arguing that the 
Nuremberg trials did not concentrate primarily on the specific plight of the Jews 
but the war crimes of the Nazis. He also maintained that the related genocide 
convention was not conceived in similar ways to the itemisation of human rights. 
Moyn (2010) contends that a necessary aspect of human rights universalism is 
international advocacy for justice and equality beyond national borders. 
However, he demonstrated that international politics actually “illustrates the 
persistence of the nation-state as the aspirational forum for humanity until 
recently” (Moyn, 2010, p. 212). He argued that human rights discourse came to 
occupy a space left derelict by the fall of other projects to establish utopias such 
as communism, pan-Africanism and nationalism. On this account, human rights 
only adopted a truly global outlook, regardless of its universalist language, in 
1977 at the start of Jimmy Carter’s presidency and when Amnesty International 
won the Nobel Peace Prize. More recently, Moyn (2018) has asserted that the 
human rights movement has arisen alongside an increasingly international and 
deregulated economy and done little to challenge the growing economic 
inequalities that characterise neoliberal capitalism. Although there has been 
significant criticism of Moyn’s empirical and normative claims about human 
rights (Alston, 2013; Blackburn, 2011; McCrudden, 2014), his account illustrates 
the precarious development of moral norms alongside intrenched power 
relations and vested interests.  
 
Other challenges focus on the Eurocentrism of human rights. The American 
Anthropological Association expressed concern in 1947 that the UDHR might 
privilege values prevalent in America and Western Europe (Engle, 2001). The 
moral and political ideologies of human rights are often seen as another 
process where dominant nations impose value systems and institutions on the 
rest of the world. It has been further argued that the unfulfilled goals of human 
rights’ universalism relate to these prescriptions being seen as a form of 
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postcolonialism (Matua, 2002). These criticisms are important but they do not 
neglect the emancipatory aims of human rights (Gaita, 1998), deny the 
heterogeneity of non-western values (Sen, 1999) or discard cross-cultural 
normative claims as arbitrary altogether (Bonnet, 2015). In fact, activists in 
many countries across the globe have made use of human rights to advance 
agendas relating to welfare and social justice (Ignatieff, 2001). However, the 
challenge of theoretical systems that have evolved in one social environment 
being uncritically exported to another is not unique to human rights. In 
particular, the interventions of clinical psychology, predicated on models of 
health developed in the global north, have increasingly spread to other 
countries as non-western systems have become globalised (Fernando, 2017).  
 
1.3. Clinical Psychology 
 
Constructing a history of the broader discipline of psychology, from which 
clinical psychology arose, presents a number of challenges (Danziger, 2013). 
Like the human rights movement, Danziger (2013) argued that there were no 
uncontroversial proposals for unification and that psychology could be 
characterised by disagreement rather than assent. While acknowledging the 
force of this argument, it will be argued that continuity can be traced through the 
foundations of psychology. The systematic scrutiny of human nature, or the 
individual human mind, understood in mechanistic terms will be shown as the 
hallmark of psychology from which clinical psychology emerged.  
 
1.3.1. The Foundations of Psychology 
Stenner (2004) stated that the roots of psychology bear a relation to the 
changing ideas of natural law discussed in the previous chapter. The subject 
matter later called psychology emerged around the modern rebirth of natural 
rights and the weakened influence of Christianity in European culture. Rights 
were now considered to reside in each individual prior to and outside of their 
involvement in any specific community or society (Stenner, 2004). Stenner 
claimed that natural law had previously been established by the authority of the 
church. As that authority diminished, the grounding of morality was articulated in 
terms of human nature and the philosophical tradition of natural rights emerged. 
These studies of human nature were self-consciously scientific and, therefore, 
15 
 
resembled modern day psychology. What is crucial about Stenner’s contention 
is that these psychological theses provided the groundwork and legitimacy for 
political proposals. Philosophers as varied as Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes and 
Hume elaborated theories about the passions, affects, appetites and 
imaginations of humans as a prelude to their thoughts about the political order 
(Stenner, 2004). Therefore, psychology, with roots in seventeenth century 
natural philosophy, was inextricably bound up with the articulation of rights and 
the justification of a political order.  
 
Richards (2010) has demonstrated that although there are discernible elements 
of theorising consistent with modern-day psychology, the questions posed in the 
18th century were markedly different. He suggested that questions concerning 
the nature of the immortal soul, the substance of the mind or how to master the 
passions represent continuities only because they demonstrate a form of 
reflexive discourse about human nature. According to Richards (2010), this 
reflexive discourse did not develop into psychology before 1850 because the 
methodologies of the scientific revolution were not used to clarify common-
sense psychological categories and the unitary mind had not crystallised in 
western thought. Psychology was also undoubtedly influenced by evolutionary 
thinking which provided a particular way of viewing humanity’s place in world 
(Richards, 2010). Pilgrim (2008) has shown how the discipline still bears the 
legacy of the discriminatory way in which these writings were interpreted in 
relation to gender, class and ethnicity. In this context, “beliefs and behaviours 
that were deemed unacceptable and alien to polite (white-European) society 
became symptoms and pathologies in models of illness or formulations of 
deviance concocted by doctors (‘alienists’ and ‘mad-doctors’, later called 
psychiatrists) and clinical psychologists” (Fernando, 2017, p. 5).  
 
1.3.2. Applied Psychology  
Applied psychology developed alongside a western cultural notion of pathology 
and drew little from other cultural traditions. Distressing thoughts or feelings that 
might have been considered the domain of religion were increasingly seen as a 
matter of health (Fernando, 2017). Rose (1985a) has illustrated how during that 
period of liberalism the sovereignty of the individual was a central political value. 
The self was viewed as having a deep interiority that was fundamentally 
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psychological and could be understood, and importantly managed, by the 
scientific technologies of the growing discipline. In this context, the 
management of psychological existence became one of the central ethical 
demands of the time (Rose, 1998), not just confined to the cultural elite but 
something that permeated the whole of society (Thompson, 2006). The 
existence of psychology as complex of discourses, practices and authorities 
used in schools, clinics, factories and the army provided the basis for the 
development of applied and clinical psychology (Danziger, 1990; Rose, 1985a). 
The prominence of the scientific method gave rise to the possibility of new 
socio-political structures for the administration of knowledge and expertise 
about human well-being. Biomedical ways of understanding lived experience 
came to dominate. Although madness can be seen as a transcultural 
phenomenon, the extent of reductionism and medicalisation was peculiarly 
western (Fernando, 2014; Pilgrim, 2014a). 
 
During this time, when individualistic, scientific and Eurocentric ideas 
dominated, psychology started to professionalise. The official beginning of 
psychology in Britain can be traced back to the Psychological Society in 1901 
which added the prefix British in 1906 to avoid confusion with another group 
named The Psychological Society (Newnes, 2014). The aim of the British 
Psychological Society (BPS) was to advance scientific psychological research 
and to improve working relations between investigators specialising in different 
branches of psychology (Hall et al., 2015). Hall (2007) has noted that the way 
that the BPS functioned was central to the development of clinical psychology in 
Britain. It was initially comprised of the educational, industrial and medical 
sections (Hall et al., 2015). At the beginning, membership was reserved for 
people who were recognised as having taught or published work in psychology 
that had particular value.  
 
In the 1930s the BPS set up the “Professional Status Committee” which led to 
the establishment of a professional register. At this stage the BPS was still both 
a learned society and maintained an open membership (Hall et al., 2015). A 
significant step in the BPS’s history came in 1941 when it became legally 
incorporated as a limited company because this was a necessary first step 
towards obtaining a Royal Charter (Jackson, 2018). This initiated a governing 
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body of elected officers and representatives of the three sections, as well as 
editors of relevant journals, which made decisions regarding communications 
with outside bodies (Hall et al., 2015). One year after the BPS became a limited 
company, Hall (2007) has noted that the first recorded meeting for a group 
practising psychology took place. At that time, the meeting was comprised 
exclusively of educational psychologists and it was suggested that they form a 
group in the BPS. The BPS Council agreed to set up that group in 1943 as a 
committee that would be subordinate to the Council and have no direct 
representation from it. This became known as the Committee of Professional 
Psychologists, Mental Health (CPP (MH)). The CPP (MH) assumed 
responsibility for professional aspects of the work of all psychologists then 
working in child guidance, education or health settings. While most of these 
psychologists were identified as educational psychologists, other early 
members of the CPP (MH) were identified as lay child psychotherapists and 
play therapists at the Tavistock Clinic. This happened in the context of 
increasing professional specialisation and the valuation of science to solve 
social problems. This fertile ground, built on the legacy of British empiricism, 
laid the foundations for the scientific method that would become prevalent in 
clinical psychology (Pilgrim & Patel, 2015).  
 
In 1958 membership of BPS was closed and reserved only for those who had a 
recognised qualification in psychology. A Royal Charter was finally obtained in 
1965 was the president, Donald Broadbent, made an application to the Privy 
Council (Jackson, 2018). This gave the BPS the right to be consulted on a 
range of government issues and protected the title of its membership (Hall et 
al., 2015). Today, the BPS is recognised as the professional membership which 
sets standards for psychologists, provides support for its members throughout 
their careers and promotes the public understanding of psychology (Jackson, 
2018). However, one of the most crucial aspects in the development of clinical 
psychology happened in the context of evolving demands in a nationalised 
health service (Pilgrim, 2010). 
 
1.3.3. The Birth of Clinical Psychology and Legal Reform 
The Beveridge Report published in 1942 proposed reforms to the systems of 
social welfare and it became increasingly clear by 1944 that legislation for a 
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national health service was imminent. By the time the National Health Service 
(NHS) Act passed through Parliament in 1946, members of the CPP MH knew 
that they needed to engage with these structures. The concurrent development 
of clinical psychology with the NHS was different from older health professions 
such as nursing and medicine (Pilgrim, 2010). From the start, clinical 
psychology was uniquely shaped in response to the demands of the world’s 
largest publicly funded healthcare provider. The right to the highest attainable 
standard of health is partly secured through the principles of services that 
should be comprehensive, universal and free at the point of delivery (Weait, 
2013). Although the profession developed in this context of welfarism, that has 
much in common with the philosophy of human rights (Weait, 2013), it was also 
shaped by other social processes.  
 
Clinical psychologists often worked under particular legal and regulatory 
constraints depending on the client group they were treating (Hall, 2007). The 
mental hospitals in which psychologists worked were regulated by the 1930 
Mental Treatment Act where patients could be defined as legally insane by a 
magistrate without seeking the opinion of a psychiatrist. The mental deficiency 
hospitals were regulated by the Mental Deficiency Acts of 1913 and 1927. 
Patients under both of these Acts of Parliament were overwhelming poor and 
their position was created by social rejection arising from perceived burden or 
threat (Pilgrim & Patel, 2015). Burton and Kagan (1983) argued that giving relief 
to the able-bodied poor in the same way would have undermined labour mobility 
and the market which would have forced wages up. In this way, the segregation 
of those deemed insane in asylums may have contributed to the development of 
free-market economy at this time (Burton & Kagan, 1983). Medical supervisors 
had formal responsibility for all of the patients and, therefore, had enormous 
legally sanctioned power. Kelly (2016) has argued that the absence of mental 
health from human rights discourse throughout this period was related to 
different factors, including the lack of a clear definition or mental illness, the 
paucity of effective treatments and the exclusion of those with mental health 
difficulties from most forms of political and societal participation.  
 
Over the next few years, psychologists achieved recognition as a graduate level 
profession. In 1957 the Ministry for Health recognised the first three training 
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courses in clinical psychology at the Tavistock Clinic, the Institute of Psychiatry 
and the Crichton Royal Hospital (Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992). In 1959 the Mental 
Health Act passed, which repealed previous legislation, and enabled institutions 
to develop more community-oriented services which had already started 
through individual initiatives since the 1930s (Hall, 2007). At this point in time, 
the CPP MH had now achieved a formal position within the NHS and as a 
Division within BPS (Hall, 2007).  
 
1.3.4. The Development of Clinical Psychology  
The handful of clinical psychologists emerging around that time were 
predominately located in settings dominated by psychiatry. Any scientific 
authority derived from proficiency at psychometric testing was no challenge to 
the institutional power of their medical colleagues (Pilgrim, 2010). Despite 
concerns that therapy was too value-laden to be properly scientific, clinical 
psychologists gradually moved into the traditional medical territory of treatment 
(Pilgrim & Treacher, 2002). The Trethowan Committee was set up to explore 
the role of clinical psychologists in the NHS in light of these increasing 
responsibilities. The Trethowan Report in 1977 sought to establish more 
independence and autonomy for psychologists. Another key step in the 
development of the profession was in response to the shortage in trained 
clinical psychologists in the NHS. Accordingly, the Manpower Planning Advisory 
Group (MPAG) was commissioned by the Department of Health to review 
clinical psychology in the UK. The MPAG commissioned a report from the 
Management Advisory Service (MAS). The Review of Clinical Psychology 
Services identified the core competencies of clinical psychologists and 
emphasised the scientist-practitioner model of training (MAS, 1989). It 
highlighted the now familiar stepped care framework of intervention at various 
levels with an increasingly sophisticated understanding and application of 
various psychological theories. Importantly, various disciplines in healthcare 
could make use of psychology in this way but the report placed clinical 
psychologists as being most suitable for intervention at the highest level. The 
value of clinical psychologists was in their unique application of psychological 
skills learned through a scientific model of training (Division of Clinical 
Psychology [DCP], 1994). Subsequent documents highlighted core 
competencies that included delivering therapy, conducting research, 
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communicating to varied audiences and improving service delivery (DCP, 
2010). However, Pilgrim (2010) has shown that clinical psychology was still very 
dominated by a particularly reductionist view of science that had largely ignored 
more interpretive forms of scientific endeavour. The challenge is that clinical 
psychologists research and engage with human experience that exists in 
dynamic and open systems (Pilgrim, 2010). Clinical psychology theory has 
implicit ideas about people and their social worlds and, therefore, is entangled 
with ethics and ideology.  
 
1.3.5. Clinical Psychology, Equality and Justice 
The diverse activities of clinical psychologists have different implications for the 
discipline’s relationship with human rights. While the values of clinical 
psychology are connected to those of human rights (DCP, 2010), psychological 
knowledge has continued to be used in ways that sustain inequalities and 
violate human rights law. For example, psychology has been used to justify the 
eugenics movement (Pilgrim, 2008), develop enhanced interrogation 
techniques, that could constitute torture, (Harper, 2004; Patel, 2003) and, more 
recently, frame structural failings of unemployment as individual psychological 
deficits (Friedli & Stearn, 2015). Patel (in press) has argued that clinical 
psychologists often overlook how their practices may breach human rights by 
pointing their finger at the failings of psychiatrists. 
 
Patel (2003) has maintained that human rights violations require the 
foundations of social and structural inequalities, marginalisation, exploitation 
and the abuse of power. There is increasing evidence that these social factors, 
especially adverse experiences in childhood, social disadvantage, poverty and 
inequity are related to mental health difficulties (Friedli, 2009; Rogers & Pilgrim, 
2003; Rogers & Pilgrim, 2013; Smail, 2005; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). 
However, social inequality has always been peripheral to the theory of clinical 
psychology (Boyle, 1997). Boyle (2011) insisted that clinical psychology had not 
engaged sufficiently with social context because it threatened its professional 
identity and its status as a scientific discipline concerned with apparent social 




The marginalisation of social context has led to an individualism in the theory 
and practice of clinical psychology (Smail, 2005). Ignoring the political context of 
distress has caused theories and practice in clinical psychology to emphasise 
individual responsibility for psychological health (Smail, 1993). A focus on 
alleviating individual suffering and distress, while important, has stunted the 
potential contribution that clinical psychology can make to understanding the 
continuation of injustice, inequality and human rights violations (Patel, 2003). 
There are also important ethical questions about the continued use of individual 
treatments to alleviate the psychological impact of adverse social conditions. 
From this perspective clinical psychology does not challenge the political order 
(Boyle, 1997), and in so doing tacitly endorses the continued violations of 
human rights (Patel, 2003).  
 
There are, however, pockets of practice that explicitly endorse a more socially 
orientated vision for clinical psychology. Recently, there have been calls in the 
profession to move beyond individual treatment and start to develop a more 
comprehensive preventive approach to psychological distress (Harper, 2017b). 
Clinical psychologists have identified the promise of community psychology 
(Smail, 1994), liberation psychology (Afuape, 2011), and activism to develop a 
more ethically responsive profession (McGrath, Walker & Jones, 2016). For all 
their differences, these approaches all emphasise the importance of clinical 
psychologists working in a more systematic manner to address avoidable 
injustice in the world and endorse a commitment to focusing resources towards 
those who are structurally disadvantaged in society. There are also clinical 
psychologists in the UK who explicitly use a human rights framework in their 
practice (e.g., Greenhill & Whitehead, 2011; Patel, 2011). However, the 
relationship between human rights and mental health has a complex history 
(Hunt & Mesquita, 2006), and its relevance to the theories and practice of 
clinical psychology necessitates further exploration.  
 
1.4. Human Rights and Clinical Psychology 
 
The most recent iteration of the “Core Purpose and Philosophy of the 
Profession” uses very similar language to that found in human rights 
instruments. It describes clinical psychologists’ work as being “based on the 
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fundamental acknowledgment that all people have the same values and the 
right to be treated as unique individuals” (DCP, 2010, p. 2). Kinderman and 
Butler (2006) argued that psychological theory could support the promotion of 
human rights by reducing the gap between the law and everyday practice. 
However, there still remain pertinent questions about the extent to which clinical 
psychology as a discipline has advanced people’s human right to health (Patel, 
2003). For many years, the human right to health was similarly overlooked by 
the international human rights community (Hunt, 1996). This started to change 
in the 1990s with a growing recognition of the importance of securing economic, 
social and cultural rights in relation to public health developments in the 
prevention of disease (Hunt, 1996). However, Hunt (2016) has argued that the 
human right to health remained under theorised as a result of its relative neglect 
in comparison with civil and political rights. In many ways, this relative neglect 
was most clear in the relation to mental health (Gostin & Gable, 2004). This 
section will explore how health has been understood across instruments relating 
to human rights. It will conclude by questioning how the content of the human 
right to health relates to the practice of clinical psychology.    
 
1.4.1. The Human Right to Health in History 
Tobin (2012) has argued that numerous civilisations have had an awareness of 
the need for collective action, humanitarian, economic or political, to address 
the health of individuals. However, the precursors to the UDHR did not contain 
any references to health. A growing awareness of the importance of health in 
international law can be traced to the distinctive philosophy of rights that 
developed in Latin America (Tobin, 2012). Tobin (2012) demonstrated how 
these constitutions placed much greater emphasis on the economic and social 
entitlements of the poor and working classes. However, Tobin (2012) also cited 
the importance of the strategic role that health played in efforts to maintain 
global peace through the League of Nations following the First World War. The 
Health Organisation and the Office International d’Hygiene Publique, that were 
later subsumed into the WHO, looked beyond epidemics and considered non-
communicable diseases, housing, malnutrition and physical fitness within the 
remit of public health (Tobin, 2012). The first mention of health, relevant for 
illuminating the current understanding of health in international law, came from 




Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and 
not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. The enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of 
every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, 
economic or social condition. (WHO, 1946, p. 1) 
 
The ideas contained in this definition continued to shape the WHO’s definition 
although the UN treaty system managed to also avoid some of its vague 
terminology by excluding reference to words such as complete, social and well-
being (Marks, 2013). Two years later, a reference to health was included in 
Article 25 of the UDHR: 
 
 Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
 wellbeing of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing 
 and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to 
 security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, 
 old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
 (UN, 1948). 
 
Morsink (1999) examined the challenge of arriving at a precise agreement 
about the content of this particular article. One of the key considerations was 
the number of different areas covered in Article 25. Merging the right to medical 
care into an article with a list of other items, left the obligations associated with 
the rights more ambiguous and open to differing interpretations (Morsink, 1999; 
Toebes, 1999). The vagueness that surrounds Article 25 was resolved in the 
drafting of Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) which simply stated that “the States Parties to the 
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” (UN, 1966, p. 1). 
Marks (2013) has noted that a salient feature of this definition was that it went 
well beyond healthcare and offered a positive definition of health. In this way, it 
borrowed significantly from the WHO’s constitution even though a leadership 
change in 1953 meant that during the drafting of the ICESCR the WHO were 
more concerned with treatment as opposed to social medicine (Marks, 2013). 
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Variations on this commitment to the human right to health in international law 
can also be found in other major UN treaties (Toebes, 1999).  
 
1.4.2. The Content of the Human Right to Health  
The human right to health is notoriously complex and it is important to 
operationalise it precisely in order to make sense of its counterpart duties (Hunt 
& Mesquita, 2006). Any theory of human rights is grounded in a plurality of 
interests as demonstrated earlier. Tasioulas and Vayena (2016) showed that 
the right not to be tortured is grounded in one’s interest in autonomy, freedom 
from pain and desire to form relationships built on trust. They argued that the 
right to health is not just grounded in our interest in health, but also in the 
interests that being healthy allows one to realise such as having a family, or 
being able to accomplish certain personally meaningful goals. General 
Comment 14, by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
affirmed that the right to health is not a right to be healthy. Instead, it has been 
interpreted as placing obligations on duty-bearers to facilities, services and 
conditions that are conducive to the realisation of physical and mental health 
(Hunt & Mesquita, 2006). This framework outlined freedoms, entitlements, non-
discrimination, participation, monitoring and accountability as core elements of 
the right to health.  
 
Both the WHO’s definition and General Comment 14 include the social 
determinants of good health, such as housing, employment, environmental 
safety, education, economic development and gender equality. However, 
Tasioulas and Vayena (2016) have argued that the human right to health has 
been interpreted is ways that are overly inclusive. These other human rights 
should not be included as they are specifically protected by other mechanisms 
and such interpretations result in health becoming too broad to be 
operationalised coherently (Toebes, 1999). Jamar (1994) has maintained that 
some aspect of the human right to health must remain distinct from other 
human rights for it to have meaning. There will be some overlap between 
different human rights in certain cases but the human right to health would be 
too burdensome to operationalise and monitor if it absorbed all rights that had a 
positive bearing on people’s health (Tasioulas & Vayena, 2016). These theorists 
maintain that the normative content of the right to health should be confined to 
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obligations regarding health services and some public health measures that are 
not already covered under other human rights. The place of mental health in the 
human right to health also demands attention.  
 
1.4.3. A Human Right to Mental Health? 
A corollary of the argument above is that clinical psychologists, and other allied 
health professionals, adopting a human rights framework to promote mental 
health need to focus on the range of human rights instruments and not just the 
right to health. Securing people’s human right to mental health may necessitate 
securing their human rights to other goods (such as political participation, 
education and equality before the law) that are not primarily justified by their 
interests in mental health. It underlines that human rights are interdependent, 
indivisible and interrelated and that a violation of one right can impair other 
rights (Patel, in press). For example, Patel (in press) has shown that violating a 
person’s access to healthcare can impair a person’s engagement with 
education, leading to poverty and exclusion that can further impair their health.  
 
In the ICESCR, both physical and mental health are defined in a positive way 
under the same article. Health, viewed in this way, is defined as the effective 
functioning of the standard human physical and mental capacities (Daniels, 
2008). Keller (2017) has argued that our understanding of what constitutes 
proper functioning is less clear for the human mind than the body. Daniels 
contended that bodily health is achieved when the parts of body perform their 
functions well. Examples include when the heart pumps blood around the body 
efficiently or the lungs and associated muscles contribute to perform gaseous 
exchange. However, it is more difficult to determine the proper function of the 
human mind, and the purpose of our thoughts, feelings and beliefs (Keller, 
2017). The WHO have proposed one way of defining positive mental health as:   
 
A state of well-being in which the individual realizes his or her own 
abilities, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can work productively 
and fruitfully, and is able to make a contribution to his or her community. 




Wren-Lewis and Alexandrova (in press) have shown that this positive definition 
of mental health has roots in WHO’s constitution about health being more than 
an absence of disease. On this account it is not enough to be free of a mental 
disorder, you also need to flourish in your community (Wren-Lewis & 
Alexandrova, in press). However, this definition proposes an overly ambitious 
notion that good mental health is realised by coping with stress, working 
productively and making a contribution to the community. Failing to realise 
these potentialities may not represent a problem with an individual’s mind but 
the actual job market (Friedli & Stearn, 2015), or the resources needed for civic 
participation (Savage, 2001). Keller (2017) has contended that positive 
conceptions of mental health always express a moral or political ideal about 
how people should live and relate to each other. Therefore, any vision of the 
highest attainable standard of mental health may be specific to different 
ideologies, religions and cultures. This will involve disagreement about what 
constitutes true mental health and, therefore, require a process of meaningful 
public deliberation.  
 
1.4.4. Relevance to Clinical Psychology 
Mental health should be a concern of distributive justice and there are sound 
reasons to consider that we have a right to good mental health (Keller, 2018). 
The common and historical use of the phrase mental health tends to be 
synonymous with professionals and services that are associated with the 
diagnosis and treatment of people with mental disorders (WHO, 2001). This 
document also argued that any conception of mental health also encompassed 
the promotion of well-being and the prevention of mental disorders (WHO, 
2001). Patel (in press) has outlined key principles that are relevant to applied 
psychologists. Drawing on those ideas, four broad areas are identified where 
human rights are considered relevant to the practice of clinical psychology.  
 
1.4.4.1. Mental Health Services: Services are increasingly focused on technical, 
short-term therapies designed to facilitate service users’ recovery (Bracken & 
Thomas, 2005, Harper & Speed, 2012; McGrath & Reavey, 2016). In addition, 
service users in secure settings are also subject to involuntary treatment on the 
grounds of medical necessity or danger and are subject to conditions that make 
coercive practices more likely (UN, 2017). Rose (2019) has pointed out that the 
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vast majority of people who might be eligible for psychological treatment do not 
access services. This argument may overestimate the prevalence of distress 
because of overly sensitive survey instruments or reflect an increased 
awareness and recognition of mental health in society. However, it may also be 
the case that the contexts where clinical psychologists train and work, as they 
are currently designed, do not meet the human rights standards of being 
available, accessible, acceptable or of sufficiently good quality.  
 
1.4.4.2. Non-Discrimination and Attention to Vulnerable Groups: Clinical 
psychologists often work with people who have faced discrimination in services 
and society. Multiple aspects of social identity are important to consider when 
elaborating how human rights are relevant to mental health. These include the 
different social locations that people occupy because of gender (Boyle, 1997), 
employment status (Friedli & Stearn, 2015) or class (Pilgrim & Rogers, 2003). It 
is important to consider how demographic variables interact with accessibility, 
quality of care and the likelihood of abuse in clinical psychology services. A key 
indicator in this respect is racial inequality in the mental health system where 
clinical psychologists work (Fernando, 2017). Patients from minority ethnic 
groups are consistently overrepresented in compulsory orders under the Mental 
Health Act (Szmulker, 2018). In addition, there is evidence that schizophrenia is 
a particularly racialised diagnosis, affecting black men in particular (Fernando, 
2017). People from minority ethnic communities continue to face discrimination 
outside mental health services in employment, housing and the criminal justice 
system (Griffiths, 2018). This is happening in the context of an increasingly 
hostile environment as a consequence of the 2014 Immigration Act which has 
meant that not everyone in the UK can exercise their right of free access to 
primary care.  
 
1.4.4.3. Participation and Inclusion: General Comment 14 stated that “a further 
important aspect is the participation of the population in all health-related 
decision-making at the community, national and international levels” (UN, 
2000). The service user or survivor movement offers an authoritative 
perspective on participation in mental health. Those who identify as having used 
or survived services have made significant contributions to research and 
delivery in mental health (Dillon, 2010; Longden, 2013; Longden, Corstens & 
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Dillon, 2013; Rose, 2003). In addition, this scholarship has challenged the 
authority of professional conceptions of mental distress and recovery (Campbell 
& Rose, 2010). An ongoing issue for the mental health community is the extent 
to which the testimony and research of service users is taken seriously. Those 
in minoritised social positions can be subject to credibility deficits owing to 
social prejudices (Fricker, 2007). Mental health service users are particularly 
vulnerable to this kind of epistemic injustice given negative stereotypes about 
mental illness (Crichton, Carel & Kidd, 2017; Kurs & Grinshpoon, 2017). This 
can result in service user consultation being little more than a technology to 
legitimise managerial decisions (Harrison & Mort, 1998). Service user 
involvement represents an alternative to the power and knowledge base of 
clinical psychology that can scrutinise whether its professed commitment to 
human rights translate into everyday practice.    
 
1.4.4.4. The Social Determinants of Mental Health: As explored previously, 
mental health is partly socially determined with mental health outcomes strongly 
related to patterns of poverty and forms of discrimination. Securing individuals’ 
right to mental health depends on addressing how the health of socially 
disadvantaged groups is related to exposure to environmental risks and 
resources (UN, 2017). More recently, the UN (2018) stated that “addressing 
societal and community-level concerns can improve the mental health and well-
being of all people” (p. 14). As discussed above, some have argued that the 
normative content of the right to health should not include the social 
determinants of mental health. Therefore, realising people’s right to mental 
health might necessitate promoting numerous interdependent human rights 
outside the usual role of clinical psychologists. These social determinants arise 
and continue outside the control of mental health services, meaning that 
treatment for the adverse psychological impact they have on individuals may be 
redundant (Pilgrim, 2018). Engaging with human rights raises important 
questions about whether clinical psychologists should address the well-being of 
the population by moving beyond individual therapy to prevent the root causes 






1.5 Rationale  
 
This opening chapter has sought to demonstrate how the practice of clinical 
psychology is connected to the forms of political, legal, and social injustice that 
human rights morality and law seek to prevent. The closing section of this 
chapter will explore why this research is being carried out and what specific 
questions will guide the study.  
 
1.5.1. Justification 
Psychology is a moral science (Brinkmann, 2011), and it has been argued that 
human rights and clinical psychology share similar values (Butchard & 
Greenhill, 2015; Kinderman, 2007). However, clinical psychology has not 
engaged consistently with human rights obligations (Patel, 2003). A central 
claim in this study is that clinical psychologists have both moral and legal 
obligations to engage with human rights and, therefore, this relationship needs 
to be understood in greater detail. Viewing human rights primarily as ethical 
claims is more relevant to the practice of clinical psychology because it 
highlights their significance in the everyday interactions in mental health 
services. This argument underlines the importance of Eleanor Roosevelt’s claim 
that securing the global aims of human rights requires concerted action from 
citizens in local contexts (Roosevelt, 1958). This moral imperative is codified in 
UK law such that the state and public authorities have a legal responsibility to 
respect, protect and fulfil people’s human rights. The HRA provides guarantees 
that all staff working for the NHS, or for bodies carrying out public functions, 
have individual human rights but are also seen as being duty-bearers.  
 
Patel (in press) has stated that governance structures in psychology often fail to 
adequately address human rights principles. This can lead to inadequate 
monitoring and processes of accountability where potential or actual breaches 
of human rights occur (Patel, in press). Hagenaars (2016) has argued that 
psychologists who believe psychology should more actively protect and 
promote human rights have argued for explicit references to human rights in the 
ethical codes of psychologists. The instantiation of human rights in documents 
relating to the practice of psychologists has rarely been the focus of discussion 
or critique (Gauthier, 2018), and the influence of legislation on clinical 
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psychology has not been researched (Patel, in press). The methodologies of 
the natural sciences have dominated the profession almost since its inception 
(Pilgrim & Patel, 2015). The scientific advances in the profession and outside 
continue to deliver important evidence about the relationship between health 
and human rights. These include the effectiveness of clinical interventions, 
access to services, experiences of involvement in services and the social 
determinants of mental health difficulties. However, science is one value 
amongst many (Midgley, 1992), and there are questions in relation to clinical 
psychology that also demand ethical consideration. Looking at the relationship 
between human rights instruments and clinical psychology affords an important 
perspective on distinctly ethical aspects of the profession within a scientific 
framework. A fuller understanding of clinical psychology’s relationship with 
human rights is necessary to understand professionals’ obligations towards 
others and the profession’s position in a liberal democracy. 
 
1.5.2. Aims and Research Questions 
Harper (2017a) has argued that wider definitions of clinical relevance should be 
incorporated into clinical psychology research. This current study aims to focus 
on the moral dimensions of clinical psychology through the duties associated 
with human rights. The research will focus on clinical psychology as a whole 
rather than the human rights dilemmas that are pertinent to particular 
specialities such as those working with people with learning disabilities, children 
and young people or older adults. Just as the scientific method is seen as 
relevant for all clinical psychologists, this research maintains that the moral and 
legal norms of human rights have relevance across all practice in the 
profession. This broad focus will be achieved through an exploration of the 
extent to which human rights have been instantiated in policies and professional 
guidance relevant to clinical psychology in the UK since the UDHR in 1948.  
 
The relationship between the profession of clinical psychology and human rights 
will be explored. Explanations for these patterns will be developed before 
critically evaluating the relevance of human rights principles and practice for the 




• What is the nature of the relationship between clinical psychology and 
human rights?  
• What were the historical conditions that could explain the relationship 
between clinical psychology and human rights?  
• What are the implications of engaging more with human rights for the 
training, practice and research in clinical psychology? 
 
1.5.3. Implications  
This research can contribute to understanding mental distress less in terms of 
individual pathology and more as a response to relative deprivation, social 
injustice and the violation of fundamental human rights (Friedli, 2009). 
Understanding how human rights and clinical psychology have related to one 
another over time may generate new areas of inquiry that could have a bearing 
on the training, practice and research in clinical psychology. It may be argued 
that an exploration of human rights is more relevant in disciplines directly 
concerned with medicolegal jurisprudence, bioethics, political science or 
international development than clinical psychology. However, this study 
contends that interdisciplinary knowledge is crucial to understanding the 
complex relationship between human rights and mental health and underlying 
the current research is a conviction that at the very least human rights are not 
incompatible with the theory and practice of clinical psychology. In fact, human 
rights offer a particular way of thinking about mental health that reflects its 



















This chapter starts by outlining the ontological and epistemological 
commitments orienting the research. An initial argument defends the view that 
understanding mental health and human rights demands attention to both realist 
and constructionist positions. It will then be demonstrated why document 
analysis has been considered the most suitable procedure within this framework 
to answer the research questions. The ongoing ethical awareness necessary in 
research will provide a means to explore the various dilemmas that may emerge 
during the process. The chapter will close by examining how my social position, 





While the distinction between methodology, methods and epistemology can 
become blurred in qualitative research (Carter & Little, 2007), Chamberlain 
(2015) has argued that the methodology is the framework underlying the plan of 
action for conducting the research. Often research in clinical psychology does 
not include discussions of epistemology (Harper, 2017a). Whether or not these 
are made explicit during the research process, all researchers have 
assumptions about the world that guide research agendas, practice and 
conclusions (Chamberlain, 2015). Methodology and epistemology often 
influence one another, and sometimes might be incommensurable (Carter & 
Little, 2007). For example, epistemology also influences clinical encounters 
because a psychologist’s understanding of people and systems often relate to 
their preferred theoretical orientation (Harper, 2017a), and method of 
intervention (Papadopoulos, 2001).  
 
Following the postmodern turn, researchers have also begun to recover a 
serious concern for ontology (Pilgrim, 2014b). The focus on discourse and 
deconstruction was useful to question the truth claims of traditional psychology. 
However, Parker (2002) acknowledged that focusing solely on epistemology 
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can collapse into a form of discursive idealism in which texts are viewed as 
being the only objects of knowledge. Furthermore, epistemological positions 
that view texts as the only source of empirical relevance can actually serve 
ideological functions that maintain oppression because “they reproduce rather 
than challenge dominant bourgeois conceptions of academic knowledge as in 
principle separate from the world and as independent of moral-political activity” 
(Parker, 2002, p. 71). In order for research to be politically expedient it must 
also theorise constructions as being shaped by the possibilities and constraints 
of the material world (Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig, 2007). Therefore, critical 
realism has been adopted in the current research because both epistemology 
and ontology are considered important for exploring the historical and material 
conditions that have influenced human rights in clinical psychology.   
 
2.1.2. Critical Realism 
Bhaskar (1978) developed a systematic transcendental realist account of 
science with the central contention that the nature of reality cannot be reduced 
to human knowledge of reality. Critical realism is the name now used for this 
philosophical framework that steers a middle course between positivism and 
strong versions of social constructionism (Pilgrim, 2014b). Subsequent 
researchers have applied these ideas to debates in the social sciences (Archer, 
2010; Porpora, 2015), and mental health (Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999; Pilgrim, 
2014b). More recently, Patel and Pilgrim (2018) have shown that critical realism 
is a useful resource for highlighting the complexities of psychologists working 
with people who have experienced human rights violations associated with 
torture. Critical realism allows a questioning approach to be taken towards what 
counts as knowledge in the discipline of clinical psychology (Pilgrim, 2014a). It 
affords a framework for asking questions about whether the ideological bases of 
clinical psychology, with a strong emphasis on quantitative research and 
evidence, limit certain questions being asked in research. Although critical 
realism does not deny the importance of epistemology for researchers, it 
asserts the primacy of ontology for analysis and discussion (Pilgrim, 2014b). 
The existence of the world is viewed as independent of human attempts to 
grasp the nature of reality. This is because, in some senses, understanding the 
world is always mediated by current historical and sociocultural ideas. However, 
within critical realism there is still a place for the role of theory to improve our 
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understanding of the world. Although ideas need to be contextualised by time 
and place, some accounts are more rationally compelling than other accounts. 
Therefore, researchers need to exercise judgemental rationality in order to 
appraise which explanations best fits with the available data.  
 
Ontological realism, epistemological relativism and judgemental rationality 
comprise the triad of claims that determine critical realism’s unique contribution 
to scientific inquiry (Pilgrim, 2014a). There are specific advantages to using 
critical realism to explore the relationship between clinical psychology and 
human rights. Reality is viewed as being differentiated and stratified which 
allows researchers to attend to both meaning and causes (Pilgrim, 2014b). At 
the transitive dimension events are mediated by experience and, therefore, 
involve some level of interpretation (Bhaskar, 1978). However, critical realism 
also posits an intransitive dimension where events occur, beyond human 
experience. Causal laws and patterns of events characterise this level of reality 
which is part of the same reality as the transitive dimension. The primary goal of 
a critical realist analysis is achieved by referring to this stratified reality that 
includes a consideration of the influence of causal mechanisms (Fletcher, 
2017). However, Chamberlain (2015) has argued that the distinction between 
ontology and epistemology is difficult to describe and maintain in practice 
because discussions about one inevitably slide into a discussion of the other. 
The challenge, then, for critical realist research is to proceed tentatively with 
scientific inquiry and attempt to express in thought the structures of things that 
act independently of thinking (Bhaskar, 1978).  
 
2.1.3. A Tiered Approach 
A qualitative methodology was chosen because it affords rich descriptions of 
phenomena (Harper, 2012), and allowed an investigation into both the meaning 
that human rights had for clinical psychology and the causes of this relationship. 
The analysis incorporated a multi-level systemic framework to explore both 
proximal and distal influences on the politics of clinical psychology (Pilgrim, 
2011; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999). Firstly, the emergence of human rights in clinical 
psychology was situated in the macro context of world history. This explored 
how the global context for an emerging moral outlook was expressed in terms of 
individual human rights and how this came to have relevance for clinical 
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psychology. It investigated the critical points in history to explain what forces 
affected how human rights were incorporated into clinical psychology following 
the UDHR. The meso context explored the role of specific institutions that were 
developing alongside developments in human rights legislation. This included 
the beginning of the NHS around the time of progressive optimism about social 
justice and economic security following the war (Pilgrim & Patel, 2015). The 
micro level investigated how the projects and pressures internal to the discipline 
of clinical psychology can explain its relationship to human rights.  
 
2.2. Methods  
 
2.2.1. Data Sources 
Different sources were considered for gathering data in the current study. 
Interview methods are often used to gather data in qualitative research (Potter 
& Hepburn, 2005). However, the research questions, and any subsequent 
interview schedule, demand historical knowledge about the profession beyond 
the core competencies of clinical psychologists. In addition, ethnographic 
methods were considered too specific to capture the broad focus of the 
research. In this instance, documents represented the best source for the 
historical purposes of the research for a number of reasons. Documents are a 
ubiquitous aspect of the formation and performance of contemporary life 
(Rapley & Gees, 2018). Bowen (2009) identified two purposes of documentary 
material relevant to the current study. The first of these is that documents 
provide important information on the context in which people operate. They give 
researchers historical insight into specific issues and indicate the conditions that 
constrain the phenomena under investigation (Bowen, 2009). Bowen (2009) 
also argued that documents provide a way of tracking change over time. In the 
current research, this included comparing how the ways in which human rights 
were instantiated in clinical psychology ethical standards may have evolved 
alongside wider societal concerns.  
 
2.2.2. Data Selection 
Data sources in the current research included official documents produced by 
bodies that regulate professional practice relevant to clinical psychology in the 
UK. This included documents from the government, NHS, the BPS, the DCP 
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and the Health and Care Professions Council (HCPC). Rapley and Gees (2018) 
maintained that sampling is crucial when working with documents. They have 
suggested that sampling procedures are inevitably iterative because accessing 
one document will draw the researcher’s attention to more material that should 
be engaged with. Key sites for this study were the BPS’s administrative 
archives and Senate House Library. Both have substantial archives containing 
publications, correspondence, reports and working papers relevant to the 
practice of clinical psychology. The archivists at both sites supported me over a 
number of weeks and highlighted documents relevant to the study. I also 
accessed the catalogue at the Wellcome Collection but, unfortunately, relevant 
collections had not been archived and were not currently available to the public.  
 
Data was included in the analysis if it met the following conditions: 
1)  Is a governmental or professional-body document relating to the practice 
of clinical psychology in the UK. A document was considered relevant to 
the practice of clinical psychologists if the profession is mentioned 
directly. Secondly, a document was considered relevant where it related 
directly to mental health and where the legal requirements, or legal 
recommendations, relate to the practice of clinical psychology.  
2)  Was written after the UDHR in 1948. 
 
Data was excluded from the analysis if it met the following conditions: 
1)  Is a legal or professional-body that is not related to the practice of 
 clinical psychology. Such a document does not mention either the 
 professional, or legal or ethical codes of conduct that are relevant to 
 the practice of clinical psychology. 
2)  Was written before the UDHR.  
 
This iterative process developed over the course of approximately one month. 
These searches revealed that 70 documents met the criteria to be included in 
the research. Eleven of these documents were unavailable which meant that 59 
documents were retrieved. After close reading of these documents, 31 were 
considered to provide a firm basis for answering the research question 
(Appendix A). All of these documents were analysed, coded fully and helped to 
establish the themes discussed in the analysis. However, it was not possible to 
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include extracts from all 31 documents in the final analysis section of the report. 
There were a number of reasons for this decision. Firstly, there was not always 
a change in content between documents analysed. For example, there were 
almost not editorial changes between the 1977 and 1978 ‘Ethical Principle for 
Research with Human Subjects’. In these instances, where possible, the 
earliest example was included as an extract. Another reason was the 
professional guidelines for clinical psychologists were prioritised over those of 
psychologists in general as this was often more appropriate to answering the 
research question. For example, although the various codes of conduct for 
psychologists, written between 1985 and 2018, provided rich material during the 
coding process, they are also written a level of abstraction in order to be 
relevant for all psychologists. This meant that often documents that were more 
directly related to the practice of clinical psychology were chosen. This resulted 
in a final dataset of 15 documents which were included in the analysis and is 




Figure A. A graphical representation of the data collection and selection process 
that yielded 31 documents for detailed coding to develop themes, of which 15 




• 70 documents considered suitable
Stage 2
• Archival retrieval
• 59 documents available
Stage 3
• Initial reading 
• Review of 59 documents
Stage 4
• Dataset for coding
• 31 documents suitable for initial coding
Stage 5
• Final dataset
• 15 documents included in writeup
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2.2.3. Data Analysis 
The study conducted a qualitative analysis of documents in the public domain 
relevant to the practice of clinical psychology in order to explore the extent to 
which they have been influenced by human rights. Rapley and Gees (2018) 
have argued that a neutral documentary analysis is not possible because 
documents were engaged with in a specific context and at a specific time. They 
suggested that there has been a change in social scientific analysis of 
documents in recent years from solely analysing the content of the document to 
understanding the ways in which they are used and developed (Rapley & Gees, 
2018). This analysis sought to explore the factors that influenced how the 
documents changed over time because of the specific work they were expected 
to do in a particular context. The texts were analysed using inductive thematic 
analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Inductive thematic analysis was chosen, as 
opposed to a deductive approach, to ensure that the themes identified were 
closely linked to the data. This method is not committed to a theoretical position 
and, therefore, allowed novel meanings and implications to shape the results 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). The research adhered to the six steps of thematic 
analysis. After familiarising myself with the documents, I conducted the initial 
coding (Appendix C). This included giving a name to small extracts of data in 
the documents.  
 
Following this, I organised the codes into broader themes. I continued to review 
these themes and named them for the purposes of the analysis (Figure B). This 
stage of the analysis was more explicitly informed by critical realism. I explored 
the extent to which the elaboration of professional standards and appropriate 
activities for clinical psychologists was shaped by wider social factors. The 
analysis was not motivated by the argument that the frameworks that clinical 
psychologists were operating under were only mediated by historical and 
cultural ideas. The professional practice guidelines of clinical psychologists 
were seen as also reflecting demi-regularities, or somewhat stable patterns 
across time and culture (Pilgrim, 2015). In this way, the analysis was respectful 
to the importance of culture but also recognised that the development of the 
profession was not solely a function of prevailing cultural trends. This approach 
elucidated both the position of human rights norms with respect to the 




The analysis was carried out on documents in the public domain. Therefore, 
NHS and University of East London ethical approval in relation to recruitment, 
informed consent and confidentiality was not required. However, a main 
contention of this research is that human rights should be the concern of 
everyone and their promotion not limited to formal procedures or legislation. In a 
similar way, research involves engaging with ethical dilemmas beyond 
mandatory guidelines. Brinkmann and Kvale (2017) have argued that ethical 
questions cannot be settled once and for all before a research project has 
begun but demand continued sensitivity throughout the process.   
 
Suzuki, Ahluwalia, Arora and Mattis (2007) illustrated that the meaning of texts 
is not transparent and requires interpretation on the part of the researcher. 
Willig (2017) has argued that a researcher has a certain amount of power in 
relation to deciding which aspects of data to highlight, how they are to be 
understood and the conclusions that can be drawn from them. From a critical 
realist perspective, this highlights the ethical significance of judgmental 
rationality in distinguishing between my own assumptions as a researcher and 
the phenomenon under investigation. Therefore, it was important to provide 
rationally compelling grounds for prioritising a certain interpretation of the social 
world. This necessitated approaching the data with a degree of modesty about 
how much it can reveal and being open to interpreting the data in alternative 
ways (Willig, 2013). The extent to which the research conformed to these 
standards will monitored throughout but evaluated systematically in the 
concluding chapter.  
 
Parker (2005) has argued that all research serves a political purpose because it 
either challenges or supports prevailing political, economic and cultural 
structures that only benefit a proportion of society. Therefore, it was also 
important to consider and address the wider ethical and political consequences 
of the knowledge produced by the research (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2017). 
Clinicians who do not identify as practising within a human-rights framework 
might read the content in the research as an attack on their practice. Secondly, 
adopting a critical perspective towards human rights could be read as tacit 
support for a status quo that arguably legitimises on-going practices of abuse, 
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discrimination and structural inequality. Some level of controversy and 
disagreement is inevitable in research that concerns fundamental moral, legal 
and political principles. I do not expect everyone who reads this work to 
necessarily agree with the impetus behind this research or the implications that 
will be drawn from it. Therefore, it is important to perform a rigorous analysis of 
the data from which credible conclusions can be drawn. This will help ensure 
that any dissemination of these ideas stimulates an informed debate about the 




Pilgrim (2014b) argued that the researcher cannot dispassionately comment on 
social reality from the outside because the questions, analysis and conclusions 
are derived from the processes in a particular society. How I influenced and 
shaped the scientific process as a researcher, therefore, should be considered 
during the enquiry. This includes the influence of the research question, how the 
design of the study and method of analysis influenced the findings. Willig (2013) 
distinguishes between two reflexive positions that invite different questions on 
the contribution of the researcher.  Personal reflexivity involves considering how 
my “values experiences, interests, beliefs, political commitments, wider aims in 
life and social identities” shape the research (Willig, 2013, p. 10). 
Epistemological reflexivity invites consideration of how my assumptions about 
the world and knowledge shaped the research.  
 
2.3.1. Personal Reflexivity  
Bhaskar (1978) stated that empirical work is mediated, often not consciously, by 
the limits of our knowledge, the assumptions of the culture and norms in the 
researcher’s immediate social setting. The consequences of ignoring this 
cognitive limitation, bias or distortion often result in what Bhaskar calls the ontic 
fallacy. The idea for this project begun with an unease about the neglect I 
perceived around complex issues of social injustice in clinical psychology. Part 
of this, no doubt, related to my background studying philosophy and the central 
place that theories of justice hold in certain branches moral and political 
philosophy. It also related to the discussions that I have had on training with my 
cohort, teachers and supervisors about the what it means to say that mental 
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health, and the professionalisation of mental health practice, is political. Out of 
these concerns, human rights became an orientating commitment for this 
research. I believe that I was drawn to human rights in particular because it 
offers a socially authoritative and morally compelling way of approaching 
dilemmas in the field of mental health.  
 
An important lesson that I have learnt during training has been the importance 
of maintaining complexity when trying to understand phenomena in mental 
health (Papadopoulos, 2007). I have tried to apply this learning both in my 
clinical work and research. It was important to remain aware that my initial 
perception that human rights had been neglected in clinical psychology could 
have limited the analysis. One of the challenges with adopting a critical 
perspective in this research was to avoid polarisation. I had to make a 
conscious effort to ensure that the analysis was neither a celebration of clinical 
psychology’s relationship with human rights nor a subversive deconstruction. In 
order to answer the third research question of where progress may be possible 
in the future, it was necessary to remain sensitive to the complexity of the 
profession’s engagement with human rights in a way that avoided a simplistic 
history. I had to let myself be constantly surprised by the data when perhaps it 
did not conform to my intuitions, or where its conformity was in a way that I had 
not expected.   
 
Human rights are one way of looking at the world and, therefore, it is necessary 
to recognise how this might have shaped the knowledge produced about clinical 
psychology in this research. For example, this approach might presume that the 
concerns of human rights and justice must be accorded priority over other 
interests and claims in mental health. Promoting and protecting human rights 
may be a necessary component of a good clinical psychologist but it may not be 
sufficient. For example, I might do the right things for my clients, but lack 
emotional depth or an inability to come alongside their problems, making it 
difficult to form meaningful relationships in therapy. Therefore, an exclusive 
focus on human rights-based approaches to mental health care can fall short of 





2.3.2. Epistemological Reflexivity  
Pilgrim (2014b) has urged researchers to avoid the epistemic fallacy of 
presuming that the theorised concepts produced by scientific methods simply 
describe reality. This occurs when researchers commit the error of over 
simplifying the correspondence between the theories in mental health and the 
experiences they seek to describe. I thought about how the epistemological 
position that I have adopted in previous research in psychology might have 
influenced my approach to the current study. I conducted a thesis for my 
Psychology MSc on masculinity that was heavily influenced by the work of 
Michel Foucault. Following this, I became interested in constructionist 
approaches which inevitably made its way into the literature that I have cited in 
this current study. It is arguable that one key difference between Bhaskar’s 
critical realism and Foucauldian approaches to discourse analysis is that the 
former emphasises ontology whereas the latter emphasises epistemology 
(Pilgrim, 2015). On reflection, I recognise that some of the claims I made during 
my analysis may have been shaped by my prior reading of constructionist 
approaches to clinical psychology as well as those informed by critical realism.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, clinical psychology is a heterogenous 
discipline composed of numerous specialities, theoretical orientations and 
health settings. The extent to which it makes sense to call anything clinical 
psychology, and hence to understand how it may operate, is achieved in this 
research through professional documents that serve to regulate and meet the 
objectives of the discipline. However, documents are not necessarily a precise 
and complete record of events as they occurred (Bowen, 2009). Therefore, 
documentary research will inevitably shine a spotlight on particular areas of 
practice and potentially leave other areas untouched which could have had a 
bearing on the conclusions. However, the regularities identified in the research 
can give rationally credible ideas about the generative mechanisms that 
constitute clinical psychology’s relationship to human rights. This underlines the 
importance of being tentative in my conclusions and the extent to which the 
knowledge derived from the research may have implications for the profession. 
It also emphasises the importance of critically evaluating the research which will 




3. ANALYSIS  
 
 
In this chapter the findings from the documents are interpreted and discussed. 
The analysis is structured under three broad sections which each contain three 
interconnected subordinate themes. The initial section describes the 
profession’s ambivalent engagement with human rights. It analyses how the 
tensions inherent in these documents have caused it to place the interests of 
the profession and the furthering of science above those of the individual. The 
subsequent section maps those aspects of human rights that the profession has 
engaged with in more depth. It examines why these particular rights have been 
the focus of professional practice in clinical psychology. It then demonstrates 
how the interdependence of human rights creates dilemmas when only certain 
rights are considered. The final section elaborates aspects of human rights that 
the profession has engaged with less but that offer possibilities for the future. 




Figure B. An overview of the three main section and three subordinate themes 

























3.1 Uneasy Foundations 
 
This section demonstrates how references to human rights in the documents 
relating to the practice and philosophy of clinical psychology lack coherence, 
consistency and substance. It explores the tensions between the professional 
and scientific aspirations of clinical psychology and the ethical and legal 
obligations of human rights.  
 
3.1.1. The Right Language  
In 1973 the DCP published the first guidance specifically aimed at the 
professional practice of clinical psychology. These guidelines were revised in 
1983 and the section below, concerning the political implications of 
psychological knowledge and practice, represented the first sustained effort to 
outline the responsibilities of clinical psychologists in relation to human rights. 
  
 13.1  Psychologists do not condone, use or participate in the application 
  of psychological knowledge or techniques in any way that  
  infringes human rights. 
 13.2  Psychologists refuse to advise, train or supply information to  
  anyone knowing that this individual intends to use the knowledge 
  or skills imparted in such a way that human rights are infringed. 
 13.3  Psychologists refuse to take part in the process of diagnosis  
  where it is apparent that the purpose of this is to limit the  
  individual’s scope for political action, whether by hospilization or 
  some other means, to discredit his or her views or to   
  constitute a form of punishment for political activities.  
 (DCP, 1983, p. 21) 
 
There a number of significant aspects to these statements. Firstly, the practice 
of clinical psychology is situated in a wider context and politicised. Clinical 
psychologists’ activities are constructed as having political implications with 
respect to participation, credibility and punishment. A number of commentators 
view the negative duties associated with human rights that the passage focuses 
on as relatively uncontroversial (Litchenberg, 2010). Pogge (2005) has even 
argued that efforts to end poverty should focus exclusively on the negative 
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duties of human rights as the requirements of positive duties can seem too 
onerous. However, Shue (1980) has shown that the distinction between a right 
requiring either negative duties, to refrain from action, or positive duties, to take 
action, rests on a false distinction. In this passage ensuring that psychological 
knowledge and practice is not misused to infringe someone’s human rights 
requires both negative and positive actions. This involves not condoning and 
participating in the application of illegal practice but also making every effort to 
ensure that knowledge is not misused. Lastly, it also recognises the clinical 
psychologist’s responsibilities with respect to infringing human rights but does 
not specify mechanisms by which an individual could be held accountable for 
those abuses. One could argue that the lack of professional accountability 
sustained the conditions for the historical abuses of power in clinical 
psychology.  
 
The principles in these early documents represented “current thinking” in clinical 
psychology (DCP, 1974, p. 1), with the caution that they should not be regarded 
as “the final word” (DCP, 1983, p. 1). This first explicit outline of human rights in 
a professional document relating to clinical psychology could have prompted 
further discussion in the discipline to elaborate and develop these ideas further. 
However, subsequent editions of the guidelines published in 1990 and 1995 
removed any mention of protecting human rights. The omission of human rights 
from clinical psychology is common. Discussion usually centres on the words 
and phrases than have become synonymous with the human rights movement. 
However, the language remains vague and there was never a specific reference 
to overarching mechanisms of accountability and process in the profession. The 
following extracts are from the Professional Practice Guidelines for Clinical 
Psychologists (1995), and the first edition of the Core Purpose and Philosophy 
of the Profession, published in 1994.  
  
 Clinical psychologists have a duty to provide services which are always 
 in the interests of the client, which are accessible and non stigmatising 
 and which enhance self-efficacy, self-worth and personal dignity.  




 The work of clinical psychologists is based on the fundamental 
 acknowledgment that all people have the same human value and the 
 right to be treated as unique individuals. Clinical psychologists will
 therefore treat all clients and colleagues with dignity and respect, and 
 work with them as equal partners towards the achievement of mutually 
 agreed goals. 
 (DCP, 1994, p. 2) 
 
Both of these documents refer to interests, respect and dignity acknowledging 
that the same values underpin clinical psychology and human rights. The 
challenge is that, as previously discussed, dignity and interests ground human 
rights but should not be identified with human rights (Tasioulas, 2012). A 
statement of values can become aspirational rhetoric unless these 
pronouncements are linked to counterpart obligations, clear lines of 
accountability, an acknowledgement of past wrongdoing in the profession and a 
clear commitment to change.  
 
There could be number of reasons for this vagueness. Tasioulas (in press) has 
argued that the corrosion of the idea of human rights, and attendant anxiety 
about the expansion of human rights, has been in part perpetuated by a 
confusion between interests and rights in international human rights law (IHRL). 
The period when the first drafts of these documents were written could also be 
characterised by political ambivalence about human rights and the extent to 
which the protections under the ECHR should be incorporated into domestic 
law. There were a number of unsuccessful attempts through the 1970s and 
1980s to introduce draft bills of human rights through parliament (Hoffman & 
Rowe, 2003). However, in the 1990s there was more support for national 
human rights legislation, given the work of campaigning organisations and a 
new government (Feldman, 1993). These external forces can account for some 
of this ambivalence but it is also important to explore the internal pressures 
relating the objectives of the emerging discipline of psychology. 
 
3.1.2. Professional Reputation  
This section explores a consequence that the professionalisation of clinical 
psychology had on its relationship with human rights. As discussed earlier, 
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clinical psychology started to professionalise from 1942 (Hall, 2007). In 1960 
the BPS established two separate divisions of professional psychologists in 
England and Scotland. The rules, outlining the aims of the division, were 
approved by the BPS Council on 19th March 1960. 
 
 3. The aims of the Division shall be 
 (a) to promote the highest professional standards in the application of 
 psychological principles to educational and clinical problems; 
 (b) to extend the contributions which psychological knowledge can make 
 towards the solution of these problems; 
 (c) to promote the efficiency and usefulness of its members by setting up 
 a high standard of professional training and conduct; 
 (d) to do all such other things as may be incidental or conducive to the 
 attainment of the above aims.  
 (English Division of Profession Psychologists (Education and Clinical) 
 Rules, 1960, p. 33) 
 
These aims prioritise furthering the professional standing of clinical psychology. 
The main focus of the division is “to promote” and “to extend” the contribution of 
its membership and psychology in general. It is taken for granted in that 
statement that psychological knowledge and principles can solve educational 
and clinical problems. A public relations exercise is needed to ensure that 
psychologists have opportunities to demonstrate their “efficiency” and 
“usefulness” in society.  
 
Four years after the DCP was established in 1966, the Clinical Services 
Standing Committee became responsible for coordinating the process of 
documenting professional practice in the division. In the first professional 
guidance document the reader is reminded that the clinical psychologist, “bears 
responsibility for humanity as a whole” and works in the “best interests of 
humanity” (DCP, 1973, p. 2). While this statement does not mention human 
rights, the globalised ethic reflects the language used in the instruments of the 
UN. There was the familiar refrain that “the psychologist only feels bound by the 
interests of the patient” (DCP, 1973, p. 5), and a reminder that “the 
psychologist’s first care is the welfare of any patient” (DCP, 1973, p. 5). 
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However, the document does not explicitly mention human rights. It only refers 
to civil rights that an individual can claim as a member of a particular society 
(Martin, 1980).   
 
 c.  The psychologists recognises the rights and reputations of  
  learning societies, organisations, or employing authorities, under 
  whose aegis he works. Products of his normal employment are 
  the property of the employer and their release for the   
  psychologist’s use and/or publication is only consequent on  
  agreement and normal practice of the employing authority. 
 d.  Criticisms of the personal, professional and ethical conduct of a 
  properly qualified psychologist colleague are never made publicly 
  but through the appropriate channels of the British Psychological 
  Society. 
 e.  A psychologist respects the rights of the psychologist in training to 
  reasonable personal privacy and his right to develop his individual 
  orientation within his professional skills.   
 (DCP, 1973, p. 7) 
  
The only time that rights are mentioned is in relation to societies, organisations, 
employers and psychologists in training. There is no acknowledgment, or 
attempt to elaborate, the civil or human rights of the people who psychologists 
see in therapy or research. Assigning rights to certain people over others can 
be traced back further in the wider profession. The earliest Standards of 
Conduct for Professional Psychologists state that “the teacher of psychology 
should in general respect the right of the student to maintain a reasonable 
degree of privacy” (BPS Annual Report, 1955, p. 19). These standards were 
published shortly after the UK ratified the European Convention in 1951 but the 
only mention of rights is in relation to trainees. They outline a prohibition on the 
“use of psychological techniques primarily for entertainment or in any other way 
inconsistent with the best interests of the person” and acknowledge that the 
“welfare of the person concerned is the psychologist’s responsibility” (BPS 
Annual Report, 1955, p. 19). The standards do not mention that acting against a 




A picture emerges, that can be traced back to the initial documents of the BPS, 
where only certain groups and organisations are explicitly designated as rights-
holders. As the profession of clinical psychology was emerging it was more 
concerned about its reputation than acknowledging and promoting the human 
rights of the people it worked with. The privileging of professional interests 
perhaps underlines the reasons for a scepticism about the influence of the 
psychological professional in contemporary society (Rose, 1985a), and 
uncertainty about whether clinical psychology has challenged the inequalities of 
power that create the conditions for human rights violations (Patel, 2003).  
 
3.1.3 The Science of Human Progress  
The danger of equivocating over human rights can be seen in the following 
extracts. They are taken from the first Code of Conduct for Psychologists (BPS, 
1985), and the first Guidelines for the Practice of Clinical Psychology (DCP, 
1973). These examples demonstrate that a concern only with interests and 
welfare can undermine the individual protections that human rights are intended 
to ensure.  
 
 The psychologist is committed to the application of his knowledge of 
 psychology to assist in the relief of distress and the promotion of the well 
 being of the patient. He places high value on objectivity and integrity in 
 his methods and seeks to attain the highest standard in the services he 
 offers within the limits of his employment.   
 (DCP, 1973, p. 2) 
   
 In all their work psychologists shall value integrity, impartiality and 
 respect for persons and evidence and shall seek to establish the 
 highest ethical standards in their work. Because of their concern for 
 valid evidence, they shall ensure that research is carried out in keeping 
 with the highest standards of scientific integrity.  
 (BPS, 1985, p. 1) 
 
These extracts emphasise the scientific, objective and impartial standards in 
psychology. The supposed neutral application of scientific principles in these 
passages underlined the unique value of psychology and its potential 
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usefulness for society. The professionalisation of the discipline of psychology 
was bound up in claims to be scientific (Rose, 1985a). The scientific label 
conferred a status on psychology that legitimised its relevance to political 
institutions that influenced the types of knowledge that were worth producing 
and investing in (Danziger, 1990; Richards, 2010). In these extracts the 
application of scientific techniques was also bound up with ethics. In the first 
extract, specialist psychological knowledge is conceived as a means to alleviate 
distress, promote well-being and serve the best interests of humanity. In both 
extracts, the entanglement of science and ethics is emphasised by the fact that 
the psychologist places value on integrity, the wellbeing of the patient and 
respect for persons. The following extract, from the first Ethical Principles for 
Research with Human Subjects published by the BPS, outlines how this 
complex interplay between science and ethics can create challenging dilemmas 
when human rights are devalued. 
 
Psychologists are committed to increasing the understanding that people 
have of their own and others’ behaviour in the belief that this 
understanding ameliorates the human condition and enhances human 
dignity. These ethical values must characterize not only applications of 
psychological knowledge but also the means of obtaining knowledge. 
Performing an investigation with human subjects may occasionally 
require an ethical decision concerning the balance between the interest 
of the subject and the humane or scientific value of the research.  
(BPS, 1978, p. 1)  
   
This extract weighs the interests of the individual against the value of research 
findings for society. It was preceded by the DCP’s statement that “a 
psychologist knowingly exposes a research animal or human subject to physical 
or emotional stress only when the problem is of considerable scientific 
significance” (DCP, 1973, p. 8). It also appears in the revision of those DCP 
guidelines, stating that “psychologists balance the possible risks to and distress 
of the patient against the likely value of the research findings before proceeding 




These passages maintain that the outcomes of research in psychology may 
have scientific value of considerable significance that could improve the human 
condition. However, as the science of psychology is elevated the human rights 
of individuals become obscured. Individual human welfare is weighed against 
the potential value that science may have for society. Trade-offs of this kind are 
ethically problematic for at least two reasons. Firstly, the research described 
might undermine the well-being of individual participants without contributing to 
any improvement in the human condition. However, even if the research did 
demonstrably improve population well-being it may have done so at the 
expense of individual participants. These extracts are governed by the utilitarian 
principle of maximising the fulfilment of human interests that dominated British 
ethical thought until at least the 1970s (Tasioulas, 2013). However, aggregating 
the constituents of well-being can justify maximising larger group interests over 
those of an individual. Human rights specifically guard against the principle of 
maximising interests across persons because the harm committed to an 
individual can be justified by an appeal to the greater good. It appears that the 
dignity and respect discussed in the first theme can be overridden in the name 
of science and human progress.  
 
Coercive interrogation and psychological torture used this same ethical 
reasoning because the knowledge extracted can maximise the interests of 
governments, society and group of individuals (Allhoff, 2003). Harper (2004) 
has outlined how psychology has been used in ways that transcend the legal 
and moral obligations of human rights. Without a clear understanding of ethical 
principles clinical psychology leaves its practice open to the types of 
exploitation, abuse and influence of power that its codes of conduct attempt to 
guard against.  
 
3.2. The Moral Horizon 
 
The human rights discussed in this section concern those that map the 
obligations between the medical professional and the patient. As discussed in 
the previous section, clinical psychologists are seen as unique providers of 
mental health care through the application of specialist psychological 
knowledge to improve psychological well-being and alleviate distress. The 
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recipients of that healthcare typically access a psychological service for support 
from a qualified professional. This socially and historically specific conception of 
healthcare has narrowed the profession’s ethical viewpoint with respect to 
human rights.  
 
3.2.1. Service Provision  
Clinical psychology developed in the context of the NHS. The interplay between 
these systems, and wider socio-political factors, have shaped modern efforts to 
understand and alleviate psychological distress.  
 
Generally clinical services are usually those in a medical/NHS context, 
dealing with clients who normally have the status of patient and who are 
suffering from a disease or disability for which they have sought the aid 
of a medical practitioner.  
(DCP, 1973, p. 4)  
 
 Clinical psychologists provide services in conditions that are of a 
 reasonable standard of comfort and safety, and bring any deficits in 
 these conditions to the attention of their management. They attempt to 
 deploy their resources in an equitable manner, and to inform  their 
 employers of difficulties in achieving this.  
 (DCP, 1990, p. 6)  
 
Kinderman (2014) has shown the historical contingencies that gave rise to 
mental health services being located in the NHS as opposed to local authorities. 
However, an individual’s experience of distress is not straightforwardly a matter 
of the mind or health (Pilgrim, 2014a), and it has been questioned whether this 
is the most suitable arrangement for service delivery (Kinderman, 2014). 
Clinical psychology rose to prominence and gained cultural legitimacy in 
medical contexts (Pilgrim, 2010), but a nationalised service for the treatment of 
mental distress is a recent and peculiarly western model (Fernando, 2017). In 
many places and times, a person who was suffering might have sought the 




Our understanding of distress, and how it is best treated, alters the profile of 
human rights associated with it. Good quality services are seen as an important 
part of content of the human right to physical and mental health (UN, 2000). 
There is an admission in the passages below in the MAS report carried in 1989 
and DCP professional standards written in 1983 that the provision of clinical 
psychology services falls short of demand. 
 
We have observed that the current clinical psychology service is patchy 
in the range of services it offers. This is clearly a result of the rapidly 
expanding demand for services not being met by the investments in 
posts and, in particular, training posts, thus causing a wide gap between 
the demand for clinical psychologists and their supply. 
(MAS, 1989, p. 153) 
  
When, due to factors beyond their control, the services that psychologists 
provide are inadequate to meet demand, a system is applied which takes 
account of the urgency of need and other factors which would determine 
priority such that services are available to patients in an equitable 
fashion. When such conditions obtain psychologists make every 
reasonable effort to bring about an improvement in the facilities available 
to them in order that their service may more adequately meet the needs 
that exist. 
(DCP, 1983, p. 10) 
 
The clinical psychologist is advised to make every effort to improve the 
availability of services. Without tying service provision to the states’ obligations 
under law it may seem overly burdensome for the individual clinician to ensure 
that services more adequately meet need. This argument should not be 
understood as suggesting that individual practitioners cannot do anything, but 
that improvements in service provision are more often a function of the socio-
political contexts in which services are made available and that reference 
should be made to these contexts. A possible reason why there is not a 
connection between human rights and service provision in these documents is 
that it was not until 2000 that article 12 of the ICESCR was interpreted and the 
content of the human right more fully articulated (UN, 2000). The MAS report 
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almost anticipates some of the criteria against which service provision should 
be measured. It is argued that the criteria used to evaluate psychological 
services should be appropriateness, effectiveness, quality, efficiency and 
implementation (MAS, 1989). This echoes the United Nations’ definition 11 
years later that services should be available, accessible, acceptable and of 
good quality (UN, 2000).  
 
One challenge for clinical psychology is the acknowledgment in General 
Comment 14 that people’s health is related to their social conditions and to the 
realisation of other rights. Michie (1981) has argued that the model of traditional 
service provision, endorsed in these texts, ensure that clinical psychologists 
help only a selected population, in ways that do not challenge deleterious social 
environments, and tacitly endorse a medical model of practice. The result of this 
emphasis on service provision has been that the focus of ethical thought has 
been largely confined to the unique relationship between the medical 
professional and designated client.   
 
3.2.2. Focus on confidentiality 
All medical professionals, including clinical psychologists, are bound by the law 
and codes of conduct to ensure that medical information about service users 
remains private and confidential. In medical contexts the dilemmas around the 
processes and limits of confidentiality are protected under Article 8 of the HRA, 
the right to private and family life. This section will explore the main features of 
confidentiality in clinical psychology and demonstrate that confidentiality should 
be connected to the protection and promotion of other human rights.  
  
Issues of confidentiality may pose difficult dilemmas, some of which have 
no ideal solutions. Whilst the need for confidentiality may be clearest 
within one-to-one therapy relationships, it is still crucial to be aware of its 
potential limits. Psychologists have a duty to share certain information 
with professional colleagues or carers, as and when necessary to the 
client’s care. They may sometimes come under pressure to reveal 
confidential information, with or without a client’s consent.  




 Every effort is made to restrict invasion of privacy of the patient. 
 Nevertheless, written and oral reports, but only those germane to the 
 requirements of the patient’s treatment, care and well-being, are  
 made available to other responsible persons directly concerned with the 
 case. 
 (DCP, 1973, pp. 4-5) 
 
These extracts show the importance of privacy as well as its limits. However, 
the particular relevance that confidentiality might have to mental healthcare can 
be developed further. Radden and Sadler (2010) outlined two ways in which the 
right to privacy may demand particular ethical reflection for mental healthcare 
practitioners. Firstly, they underlined how privacy is valued in liberal societies 
and argue that users of mental health services have rights against the exposure 
of intimate details of their personal lives and the associated embarrassment and 
shame. Secondly, they argue that the distinctive negative consequences of 
stigma associated with categories of mental distress have few parallels in 
nonpsychiatric diagnoses with HIV being a notable exception (Radden & Sadler, 
2010). The consequences of breaking confidentiality are explored in this 
passage below. 
 
 Psychologists recognize that their professional relationship with patients 
 are based on trust and confidence and that in the course of intervention a 
 psychologist may acquire intimate knowledge of a patient’s personal life. 
 Psychologists are aware of this position of privilege which they occupy in 
 this respect and the emotional dependency which the patient may 
 develop such that the latter becomes vulnerable to exploitation.  
  (DCP, 1983, pp. 29) 
 
The resulting exclusion can have an impact on people’s ability to secure other 
human rights such as those associated with work, liberty and freedom from 
discrimination. While it is important that confidentiality is emphasised throughout 
these documents, it is often treated in isolation and disconnected from other 
human rights. This relationship between power and human rights is also implicit 




 Trainee psychologists make no attempt to conceal their trainee status 
 from patients, colleagues or members of other profession. They 
 recognize that in some instances it may be necessary to make explicit 
 the implication of their trainee status for such matters as confidentiality 
 and legal responsibility and the limitations upon these that status may 
 impose.  
 (DCP, 1983, p. 12) 
 
The rules about what information can be collected and under what conditions 
are connected to social stratification in terms of status, class and power (Marx, 
2007). The guidance dictates that the psychologist should disclose their trainee 
status. There is an implicit recognition of the rules governing the disclosure of 
information. In this case the privacy of the clinical psychologist, or trainee 
clinical psychologist, is at stake. For the most part, the rules that govern the 
clinical encounter dictate a flow of information in a way that is not reciprocated 
by the therapist. A service user discloses intimate information about their life in 
the hope of an improvement in well-being or an alleviation of distress. Newnes 
(2014) has questioned the scope of what the patient should know about the 
therapist’s life. It may be possible for the service user to discern a significant 
amount of information already given visible characteristics and demographics of 
the clinical psychologist. Given the close relationship between the therapist and 
the patient, and the very real possibility of abuse, should the service user have 
a right to certain information about the therapist that might affect their care? 
Clinical psychologists can judiciously disclose certain facets of their life that they 
deem to be clinically relevant. Newnes (2014), however, demonstrates that 
revealing useful aspects of the clinical psychologist’s private life assumes that 
therapists can know how the service user will interpret the information which 
can only be made after the disclosure. These kinds of examples demonstrate 
how the power imbalances inherent in therapeutic relationships demand an 
ethical sensitivity with regard to the client’s human rights and our obligations to 
protect those rights. This relationship between power and human rights is more 






3.2.3. Informed Consent, Complexity and Power 
Manson and O’Neill (2007) argue that the history of informed consent in liberal 
thought can be traced back to the European Enlightenment. Debates about 
consent in politics and economics have been paralleled by discussions in 
medical ethics where it now plays a central role. The Nuremberg Code of 1947 
followed the involuntary medical procedures perpetuated by the Nazis and 
focused on research participants giving voluntary consent. The following 
extract, from the Ethical Principles for Research with Human Subjects (BPS, 
1978), illustrates the relationship between informed consent and psychological 
research.   
 
Wherever possible the investigator should inform all participants of the 
objectives and, eventually, the results of the investigation. Where this is 
not possible the investigator incurs an obligation to indicate to the subject 
the general nature of the knowledge achieved by such research and its 
social value. 
 (BPS, 1978, p. 1) 
  
Medical practice has moved from general consent to highly specific consent 
(O’Neill, 2004). An initial challenge with informed consent relates to specifying 
how much, and when, information should be given for consent to be considered 
as being informed (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2017). Manson and O’Neill (2007) have 
argued that the Helsinki Code has been redrafted numerous times since 1964 
and that patients are expected to understand extremely complicated matters 
like research design, aims of the research and financial structures. They 
question whether the aims of fully informed consent can ever be realised under 
such conditions and how this leaves the ethical standing of research, given the 
inevitably of withholding and misunderstanding information. Following this, the 
requirements of informed consent have been extended from research to clinical 
ethics (Manson & O’Neill, 2007), and the next passages from professional 
practice guidelines from the same decade demonstrate the distinct dilemmas of 
informed consent in relation to treatment. 
 
Clinical psychologists should take into account the power imbalances 
which may reduce the voluntary nature of informed consent, considering 
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their own role in the process and those of other staff, family and carers. 
The impact of such imbalances is likely to be greatest in institutional 
settings and high-dependency services; it may also be particularly 
important when working with children and families. Empowering a client 
to make his or her own choice, independent of persuasive others, may 
be the most therapeutic course of action in some situations.  
 (DCP, 1995, p. 23) 
  
Clinical psychologists recognise that a client compulsorily detained for 
treatment under the provisions of the law or other directed by a court of 
law to receive treatment may not necessarily be in a position to withhold 
consent to intervention. In such cases, the obligation to make every effort 
to obtain valid consent remains.  
 (DCP, 1990, p. 5)  
 
One of the most controversial aspects of supposed mental health care is 
coercion (Szmukler, 2018). The involuntary treatment and detention of people is 
lawful for those deemed to be a risk and suffering from a diagnosable mental 
health disorder. Szmukler (2018) has argued that mental health law in England 
and Wales discriminates against patients because they can be subject to 
involuntary treatment even if they have capacity. In these extracts there is a 
recognition of the power imbalances in the relationships between mental health 
services and the recipients, users or survivors of those services. This raises the 
importance of conceptualising power when thinking about informed consent.  
 
The BPS maintain that “the concept of informed consent relates to the client’s 
right to choose whether to receive psychological services, and to make this 
choice on the basis of the best information available presented in the most 
appropriate way” (BPS, 2017, pp. 48). O’Neill (2003) has argued that the way in 
which informed consent relates to autonomy, and exercising the human right to 
self-determination, is deeply obscure. She maintains that often informed 
consent protects choices that are “timid, conventional, and lacking in individual 
autonomy” as well as choices that are “assertive, self knowing, critically 
reflective, and bursting with individual autonomy” (O’Neill, 2003, p. 5). In 
contexts of coercion or compulsion the notion of empowering a client to make 
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their own choices and making an effort to obtain valid consent may seem like 
hollow guidelines. The rising rates of involuntary admissions, particularly for 
people from minority ethnic groups (Singh et al., 2007), relates to the 
cumulative disadvantages of unemployment, poverty and socio-economic status 
(Morgan et al., 2008). The relationship between informed consent and wider 
inequalities in society is not explored in these guidelines.  
 
3.3. The Challenge of a Possible Future 
 
This section explores the possibilities in the documents for a new clinical 
psychology oriented towards the concerns of human rights. It explores the 
development of non-discriminatory practice, working with people in everyday 
contexts and the challenges of public health approaches in clinical psychology. 
 
3.3.1. Non-discrimination  
Following the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the Race Relations Act 1976 and 
the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, the BPS released ethical 
guidance in relation to non-discrimination. Guidelines on the Use of Non-sexist 
Language were approved by the society’s council in October 1987. This was 
followed by a statement on Sexual Harassment at Work and the Ethics of Dual 
Relationships, approved in May 1993, an Equal Opportunities Policy Statement 
which the council approved in February 1993 and the fully drafted policy which 
was approved in February 1994. All of these documents were written after the 
UK ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination in 1969 and on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 1986. These various statements focus on 
definitions and language guidance but there is no reference to human rights. 
There is a recognition of good practice and duties in relation to course content, 
working environment, representation on committees and complaints 
procedures. This focus can also be seen in the 1983 guidelines and the latest 
edition of The Core Purpose and Philosophy of the Profession (2010).   
 
Psychologists are sensitive to the need to tailor their services according 
to the individual characteristics of the persons receiving them, including 
such variables as age, sex and socio-economic and cultural background. 
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Where necessary, they seek special training, knowledge, experience, or 
advice to enable them to provide a competent service to particular 
population. 
(DCP, 1983, p. 6) 
 
The personal and professional skills of psychologists include the ability to 
work effectively with clients from a diverse range of backgrounds and to 
have an awareness of social and cultural factors. Whilst working at an 
appropriate level of autonomy they accept accountability to professional 
and service managers and recognise their own personal development 
needs.  
(DCP, 2010, p. 7)  
 
Working with people from diverse backgrounds is seen through the lens of 
competence across these documents. It becomes necessary to acquire 
knowledge to tailor interventions for those in receipt of services and to develop 
appropriate levels of cultural awareness. Patel (2010) has noted that the 
professional language of diversity has replaced the emphasis on antiracism and 
multiculturalism. In this context, the development of cultural knowledge and 
sensitivity is privileged at the expense of addressing racism, discrimination and 
whiteness (Wood & Patel; 2017).  
 
The idea of competence has always been a prominent feature of clinical 
psychology in the UK. The aims of the Scottish Division of Clinical 
Psychologists (Educational and Clinical) were “to be concerned with all matters 
affecting professional competence, training and conduct of its members” 
(SDCP, 1960, p. 88). The psychologist also “recognises that there are 
boundaries to his competence” (DCP, 1973, p. 2), and “constantly endeavours 
to develop and maintain their professional competence (DCP, 1983, p. 5). 
Competence extended to administrative duties, psychological testing, working 
relationships with colleagues and the accurate assessment of more junior 
psychologists’ competence. From these appraisals of competence, the idea of 
specific competencies emerges in the guidelines (DCP, 1995). However, the 
notion of cultural competence has been criticised because it can imply a fixed 
point where sufficient knowledge and practice have been accumulated rather 
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than a constantly evolving process of critical reflexivity (Dogra, Vostanis, & 
Frake, 2007). Kirmayer (2012), while acknowledging some value in cultural 
competence as possible resistance against homogenous approaches to mental 
healthcare, warns of essentialising and commodifying culture into stereotypes 
that can further disempower patients. Discrimination can be perpetuated by 
seeing “race and ethnicity as unitary or an assumption that knowing about these 
cultures solves the problem of equality, fairness and availability of services” 
(BPS, 2017, p. 33). These recent Generic Practice Guidelines from the BPS 
provide a more insightful contribution to professional guidance around 
discrimination.  
 
Psychologists should bear in mind the history of racism and the early 
development of western psychology and culturally biased testing in 
favour of white, middle-class children. Psychologists need to recognise 
that multi-ethnic groups are not homogenous groups and there are wide 
regional and local differences amoungst these groups which can be split 
by language, dialect and regional variation. 
 (BPS, 2017, p. 33) 
 
Black and minority ethnic (BME) LGBTQ people have to negotiate 
between the values and beliefs of mainstream and minority ethnic 
cultures. Cultural difference in norms, beliefs, and values can be a 
source of psychological stress. There may be no particular sexual and 
ethnic minority group to which a BME LGBTQ person can anchor their 
identity and obtain acceptance and support. 
(BPS, 2017, p. 35)  
 
The first passage situates the profession of clinical psychology in the wider 
context of racism in society and Eurocentricism in the development of 
psychological theories and practice. It is explicit about the importance of not 
homogenising groups. The second passage identifies the specific challenges 
that those with intersecting social identities, with respect to ethnicity, sexual 
orientation and age. There is also an acknowledgment of the psychological links 
between discrimination and identity and the potential for isolation and social 
exclusion. Although this is not explicit in this document, it underlines the 
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importance of conceiving of human rights as being interdependent with one 
another (World Conference on Human Rights, 1993).  
 
3.3.2. Participation or Inclusion? 
The relationship between participation and inclusion is complex and contested 
(Quick & Feldman, 2011). The CRDP contains perhaps the most authoritative 
statement in relation to inclusion. Inclusion is viewed as the existing and 
potential contributions that people can make to the well-being and diversity of 
their communities (UN, 2008). In the domain of civil and political rights, 
participation has been interpreted as the right to organise a political party, vote 
or express political opinions. In the context of the right to health, it has been 
understood as the right to participate in health-related decision-making 
processes. Quick and Feldman (2011) argue that participation and inclusion are 
different dimensions of public engagement. Participation involves inviting as 
many to contribute towards decisions, making the process as accessible as 
possible and trying to ensure that these opinions are representative. They argue 
that inclusive practice may enhance participation but that it also builds the 
capacity of communities to implement decisions and address issues as they 
arise over time (Quick & Feldman, 2011).  
 
Applied psychologists have a role in making the case and creating the 
right conditions for effective user and carer participation…. Service user 
workers in teams can understand, empathise and communicate to health 
professionals the complexity of current service users’ difficulties from a 
unique perspective. They can provide a voice and much needed 
advocacy.  
(BPS, 2007, p. 32) 
 
 Service delivery competencies include working with service users and 
 carers to facilitate their involvement in service planning and delivery, 
 working with issues and mechanisms to  facilitate organisation change, 
 and developing and sustain effective partnerships with a range of 
 commissioners and delivery systems. 




In these extracts, psychologists are positioned as being responsible for creating 
conditions that facilitate participatory practices for both service users and 
carers. The advantages, in the first extract from New Ways of Working for 
Applied Psychologists in Health and Social Care (BPS, 2007), include the ability 
to empathise with current service users and hold a psychosocial perspective in 
relation to their difficulties. This allows users participating in services to 
advocate for other service users by communicating with healthcare 
professionals. One of the challenges for participation strategies fulfilling their 
obligations under the human right to health is the extent to which they genuinely 
serve the interests of those involved. Arnstein (1969) demonstrated that 
participation can range from non-participatory strategies to tokenistic efforts that 
involve sharing information, inviting consolation or offering placation. As 
described earlier, this can include involvement to legitimise pre-conceived 
managerial decisions (Harrison & Mort, 1998). Arnstein defined more genuine 
approaches to participation as those that involve professional power being 
transferred in order to realise partnership, delegation and citizen control. Tritter 
and McCallum (2006) argued that Arnstein’s model overly focuses on the 
transfer of a unitary conception of power to improve health-related practices and 
outcomes. It is also important to evaluate the user’s satisfaction with the 
process and acknowledge that involvement is one part of a larger process that 
can lead to system-wide reforms (Tritter & McCallum, 2006). Halabi (2009) has 
questioned how the human right to participation in shaping health practice and 
policy relates to political participation and social inclusion. The extracts below 
highlight that inclusion relates to wider structural issues and human rights 
suggesting a broader vision for clinical psychology than working on an individual 
level with clients in services. 
 
Social inclusion is the process where the needs of all members of 
communities and the groups which constitute them are recognised, 
prioritised and met, resulting in these individuals feeling valued and 
respected. Promoting social inclusion is a broader task than promoting 
equality and tackling discrimination and stigma. It requires psychology 
professionals to address wider structural issues in society which maintain 
excluding processes and power differentials.  




Contributors to this document made the point that teasing out the 
teamworking issues with respect to social inclusion was problematic in 
that all psychological practice should be concerned to promote inclusion 
as a human right.  
(BPS, 2007, p. 52) 
 
Those with mental health difficulties are often excluded from paid employment, 
housing, lifelong learning and participation (BPS, 2007). The notion that 
individuals are recognised, valued and respected links with the idea of full 
citizenship for those who have experienced mental health difficulties. The 
Generic Guidelines (BPS, 2017) state that psychologists are encouraged to 
promote equality, recognise the distress caused by exclusion and challenge 
social conditions that contribute to social exclusion and stigmatisation. The new 
ways of working document advocates a stronger vision that human rights 
should not be an addition to practice but a core element of practice. In addition 
to the scientist practitioner, it highlights the value of developing a rights-based 
practitioner identity for clinical psychologists.  
 
These ideas link to community psychology that values community as the 
articulation of human hopes for diverse people to be welcomed and included 
(Kagan, Burton, Duckett, Lawthorn & Siddiquee, 2011). However, Smail (1994) 
has warned that community psychology’s naïve utopianism can give way to a 
cynical pessimism associated with burnout. The theories of community 
psychology have also been described as being wholly political, with the 
psychological dimension undertheorised, which invites scepticism about the 
necessity of psychologists being involved with these projects (Newnes, 2014). 
Another challenge is with the notion of inclusion. Kagan et al. (2011) note that 
the idea of community is itself contested and that community can be oppressive 
for some people. For example, social cohesion does not afford resilience 
against mental health difficulties in a uniform way across social groups (Rogers 
& Pilgrim, 2014). Indeed, increased participation for women may actually 
increase symptoms often associated with a variety of diagnostic categories 
(Rogers & Pilgrim, 2014), which may relate to patriarchal expectations in some 
social networks for women to provide support for others (Manne, 2017). This 
65 
 
last challenge points towards the aims of intervention to improve specified 
outcomes for particular individuals or groups in the context of other public health 
initiatives.  
 
3.3.3. Prevention and its Targets 
A theme across these texts was that clinical psychologists can do more than 
therapy. The MAS report introduced the idea that psychological skills can be 
applied at three levels. Each level requires greater understanding of 
psychological theory, competence and flexibility. This section reviews how 
clinical psychologists being more than therapists relates to human rights.   
 
It is important to emphasise that clinical psychologists may have their 
greatest influence on enhancing psychological well-being of service 
users by working at systemic levels. There will always be more demand 
than psychologists can fulfil, so by working with organisations to provide 
psychologically appropriate services, or by working in a staff 
development and supervision mode, clinical psychologist can ensure that 
many more users have access to psychologically informed practice than 
can be delivered by psychologists alone. 
(DCP, 2001, p. 5) 
 
When engaged in the planning and development of health care services 
and the formulation of health care policy, psychologists bring to bear their 
specialist knowledge so as to promote the psychological well-being of 
those in receipt of such services. In doing so psychologists acknowledge 
the influence that environment has on human behaviour, and they take 
account of this influence especially when involved in the planning or 
management of institutional care facilities.  
(DCP, 1983, p. 10) 
 
Having a greater impact at systemic levels in the first extract is defined as 
providing appropriate services, staff development and supervision. Therefore, 
this first model reinforces the traditional model of service delivery, encouraging  
improved access to clinical practice that is informed by psychological principles. 
The extracts emphasise giving away psychological knowledge, language and 
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techniques (Rose, 1998). Wright (2015) has argued that the concern 
psychology had for occupational growth and legitimacy ran in parallel with the 
idea of giving away the science of psychology and embedding itself in important 
institutions. This can also be seen in the second extract where, in addition to the 
development of health services, clinical psychologists are also involved in the 
formulation of policy. However, the formulation of policy is solely directed at 
improving the well-being of those accessing psychology services. Although 
there is an understanding that clinical psychology should influence the 
environment and work at other levels of intervention, these extracts do not 
directly address the underlying determinants of health. The MAS report more 
directly outlines preventative strategies in relation to clinical psychology.  
 
The preventative dimension is grossly inadequate. There is a need for a 
more primary/prevention-focused service – amongst the “worried well” 
are tomorrow’s more seriously and chronically mental ill. Prevention is a 
more cost-effective alternative to waiting for individuals to become 
dependent on health services and consequently more expensive to treat.  
(MAS, 1989, p. 5) 
   
Psychology has a significant contribution to make to the health and 
wellbeing of the population….It is in the activities of preventing people 
from becoming ill through their own behaviour or psychological state and 
in the development of effective complementary and alternative therapies 
to medical strategies that healthcare psychology is likely to make its 
biggest impact.  
(MAS, 1989, p. 175) 
 
Caplan (1964) argued that preventative interventions can take three forms. 
Primary prevention aims to reduce the incidence of new cases of mental 
disorder by focusing on the environment and strengthening people’s capacity to 
cope with situations. Secondary prevention aims to shorten the duration of 
cases of mental disorder and, therefore, might be seen as a form of treatment. 
Tertiary prevention tries to ensure that people who are recovered from, or 
coping with, severe forms of mental distress can participate in community life if 
they desire. Radden (2017) has argued that the distinction between different 
67 
 
types of prevention can become blurred because of the difficulty in conclusively 
identifying the onset of mental disorders from so called states of normality. 
These challenges are reflected in the lack of clarity in this report. The first 
extract maintains that prevention is about treating the worried well. Although it is 
not outlined specifically in the review, this type of prevention would fall under 
the heading of secondary intervention. It involves selecting a particular group in 
society, the “worried well”, for intervention aimed at preventing them from 
becoming chronically unwell, dependent on health services and, therefore, 
costing the state money. Alleviating human suffering is justified by economic 
rationality. Such arguments position our relationships with those diagnosed with 
mental health problems in terms of burden rather than care and solidarity 
(Rose, 2019).  
 
The second extract is more focused towards primary prevention by using 
phrases like “the wellbeing of the population” and “preventing people from 
becoming ill”. However, this change to population-level strategies is not 
acknowledged in the review. Universal strategies of this kind are distinct 
because they do not select particular populations for intervention. Instead they 
aim at what is good for everyone and, therefore, universal strategies may be 
less susceptible to ethically problematic issues around consent, stigmatisation 
and medicalisation (Radden, 2017). However, the report plays down the 
relationship between the socioeconomic determinants of health and prevention. 
It was written at a time following the Whitehall Study of British civil servants 
(Reid et al., 1974), the Black Report (Gray, 1982) and during the second The 
Whitehall study (Marmot et al., 1991). While the Black Report was buried under 
the new conservative government (Bartley, Blane & Davey Smith, 1998), all 
these studies emphasised the importance of long-term, cross-cutting 
government policies to tackle the social and economic determinants of health 
inequalities. However, the MAS review continually emphasises health 
behaviours and the responsibility for health is placed firmly with the individual. 
The vision of prevention aimed at behavioural science still influences 
government strategies (Cromby & Willis, 2014). This exclusive focus on the 
individual risks ignoring the impact of human rights violations and obscuring the 







The first three sections of this chapter address each research question in detail 
and explore the extent to which they were answered. The research questions 
are restated here for clarity: 
 
• What is the nature of the relationship between clinical psychology and 
human rights?  
• What were the historical conditions that could explain the relationship 
between clinical psychology and human rights?  
• What are the implications of engaging more with human rights for the 
theory, research and practice of clinical psychology? 
 
The concluding section is a critical review which analyses the strengths and 
limitations of the research project, considers alternative ways that the questions 
could have been approached and outlines what I have learnt from the process.  
 
4.1. The Relationship between Clinical Psychology and Human Rights 
 
The overarching aim of the research was to explore the moral and legal 
dimensions of clinical psychology through the lens of human rights. The initial 
research question focused on the nature of that relationship and will be 
explored more fully in this section.  
 
4.1.1. Changing Focus 
This research could be considered in opposition to the sanctioned histories of 
the psychological sciences (Rose, 1998). Rose (1998) argued that a critical 
history of psychology seeks to “question the certainties of the present by paying 
attention to the margins and the processes of their marginalisation” (p. 43). The 
analysis demonstrated that human rights were vaguely referenced in the codes 
of conduct that guided clinical psychology as it was shaped during the latter half 
of the 20th century. There was a clear statement of human rights in the 
guidelines for professional practice in 1983. Clinical psychology did not develop 
as sophisticated and complex an appreciation for morality as it did for science. 
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The history of human rights in UK clinical psychology is one of marginalisation. 
These include the tendency of human rights to be thinly theorised in the 
profession, for them to come more sharply into focus at different periods and for 
a certain subsection of rights to be more fully elaborated. However, the claim 
that human rights have been marginalised in the profession of clinical 
psychology needs to be elaborated further.  
 
Clinical psychology is a heterogenous discipline comprising broad models of 
practice, client groups and health settings (Llewelyn, Beinart & Kennedy, 2009). 
Therefore, in keeping with a critical realist philosophy, claims about the whole 
profession standing in relation to a body of thought need to be made cautiously. 
It has been discussed that at times the professional practice of clinical 
psychology used the language of human rights. The most significant example of 
this tendency was the passage concerning the political implications of 
psychological knowledge and practice from the 1983 guidelines. This discussion 
of professional standards represents the most sustained reference to human 
rights throughout any of the division’s documents on professional practice. 
However, these pockets are exceptions and even contradict other passages in 
the same document. For example, the 1983 guidelines also contain a 
discussion about “weighing scientific and human values” (pp. 14). This was 
described earlier as inviting the type of utilitarian calculations that human rights 
morality specifically guards against. Therefore, a linear history of progression or 
regression concerning human rights in clinical psychology should be rejected. 
Rather the documents that were analysed in relation to human rights 
demonstrate a lapsed history characterised by “false paths, of errors and 
illusions, of prejudice and mystification” (Rose, 1998, p. 42). Had these paths 
been taken, or more fully trodden, the profession might look very different today.  
 
Another challenge with defining the relationship of clinical psychology with 
respect to human rights concerns the status of the documents analysed. Harry 
Brierley, who chaired the sub-committee that drew together the first professional 
guidelines in 1973 acknowledged that the guidelines would not solve all the 
problems of the profession (DCP, 1973). Commenting on the 1974 guidelines, 
the chair who convened the working part of the 1983 guidelines, Miles 
Mandelson (DCP, 1983) said that it was unclear the extent to which the 
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previous guidelines had been disseminated to members of DCP and whether 
they had been helpful. Therefore, it is important to question the extent to which 
guidance is reflective of practice and whether the guidelines provide a 
meaningful window on the profession’s relationship with human rights. Newnes 
(1996) has questioned whether the values expressed in the professional 
documents relating to clinical psychology are driving forces for change or 
merely expressions of what it deemed good. In response to this, it is possible to 
contend that the documents still capture a consensus about how professionals 
should be practising clinical psychology. Newnes (2014) later argued that 
guidelines have an undeniable authority in promoting clinical psychology. 
Therefore, the documents not only reflect what professionals should be doing 
but also what the profession should be seen to be concerned about. These 
documents developed over time and gained a certain authority via a historical 
consensus. It is possible to conclude that, while the documents do not represent 
an eternal truth about the profession, it is possible to discern continuities in the 
way that people understood their practice, or wanted to present it to others. 
These processes offer a meaningful insight into some of the preoccupations 
and challenges that the profession has sought to resolve.   
 
4.1.2. Engagement 
Clinical psychology’s engagement with human rights has a particular character. 
The ethical principles described in the professional practice guidelines, some of 
which are aligned with human rights, have been discussed in circumscribed and 
superficial ways. Particular human rights were more in focus than others and 
the complexity of human rights in the practice of clinical psychologists have not 
been engaged with in sufficient depth.  
 
Human rights are seen as being indivisible, interdependent and interrelated 
(World Conference on Human Rights, 1993). There is much scholarly debate 
about the precise meaning and implications of this phrase (De Beco, 2019), but 
one promising approach emphasises that indivisibility emphasises that human 
rights are strongly interdependent (Nickel, 2008). Clinical psychology’s 
ambivalent relationship with human rights has meant that concerns about 
consent, privacy and discrimination have been focused on and developed in 
ways that are meaningful and relevant to the profession. However, this current 
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state of affairs, which gives priority to certain categories of human rights, can be 
ineffective because it hinders the fulfilment of other rights (De Beco, 2019). 
Patel (2010), for example, has shown that diversity agendas in clinical 
psychology tend towards this myopia because they often do not aim to address 
institutional racism or the wider socio-political structures that sustain 
discrimination. This narrow focus in clinical psychology invites particular ethical 
dilemmas while precluding others. It is perhaps this picture that accounts for 
clinical psychology’s avoidance of social context (Boyle, 2011), narrow scope of 
intervention (Harper, 2017b), and reinforcement of inequalities associated with 
human rights violations (Patel, 2003).  
 
Another important oversight has been the depth of engagement with the 
substantive issues of human rights morality and law. It is claimed that “clinical 
psychologists will adhere to and be guided by explicit and public statements of 
the ethical principles that underpin their work” DCP, 2010, p. 2). However, while 
the professional guidance uses words relating to human rights instruments, any 
meaningful integration of clinical psychology with human rights has not been 
sufficiently theorised. Therefore, it is important to question the extent to which 
the profession has elaborated on these principles and whether it is possible to 
discern the implicit ethical assumptions that shape the guidelines for practice. A 
number of searching questions that might be asked in this regard: 
 
• What does it mean that we all have a human right to mental health? 
• Is clinical psychology as it is currently practised the best way to realise 
the human right to mental health? 
• How does the profession of clinical psychology, with respect to its 
theories and practices, contribute to the realisation of this human right? 
• What is the scope of clinical psychologists’ obligations under human 
rights law and morality? 
• How does clinical psychology address aspects of human life that are not 
usually considered the domain of health professionals but that have a 
bearing on people realising their human right to mental health? 
 
The formal documents of clinical psychology have intermittently and 
occasionally used the congenial language of human rights without engaging 
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with the far harder intellectual and practical labour of specifying the correlative 
obligations, practices and training necessary to promote and protect these 
rights. What do the professional proclamations of respect, dignity and equality 
mean to people working and living in contexts of disadvantage, injustice, 
coercion and compulsion? Clinical psychology’s aim is to “reduce distress and 
enhance and promote psychological well-being (DCP, 2001, pp. 2), but without 
a more developed engagement with these challenges it may only be able to 
realise this goal for a privileged section of society.  
 
The history of clinical psychology’s ambivalence and false starts in relation to 
human rights undermine any possibility of recounting a linear narrative of 
progression or regression. The profession of clinical psychology has fallen short 
of its ethical and legal responsibilities in relation to human rights. However, 
there have also been pockets of ethical awareness in professional guidance 
and practice. There continue to be principled actions of individuals and groups 
of clinical psychologists seemingly working against the guidance of their 
profession. It is vital to recognise both the ethical shortcomings in the profession 
and the examples of practice that open up avenues for a more ethically oriented 
future. Seeing clinical psychology from both perspectives can guard against the 
perils of disillusionment and idealism common to both human rights and clinical 
psychology.  
 
4.2. Explaining the Relationship  
 
The second research question sought to outline possible mechanisms that 
could explain this ambivalent relationship between human rights and clinical 
psychology. Retroduction is the distinctive form of inference associated with 
critical realism which posits that events can be explained through hypothesising 
about causal powers (Hu, 2018). In keeping with the principle of judgemental 
rationality, this discussion will seek to establish a rationally plausible account for 
the relationships discussed in the analysis at three levels of conceptualisation 
(Mohan, 1996; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999). These conclusions were discussed in 
the analysis but they are presented here in a more systematic way. The macro-
level account will suggest that the relationship between human rights and 
clinical psychology was shaped by global and transcultural forces beyond the 
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control of individual nations. The meso-level accounts for how particular 
ideological, political and policy contexts contributed to the discipline’s 
engagement with human rights at a national level. The micro-level 
interpretations emphasise how the internal characteristics of clinical psychology 
in the UK shaped its engagement with human rights.  
 
4.2.1. Macro-Level   
Inconsistencies in international human rights law (IHRL) have contributed to the 
ambivalent way that clinical psychology has incorporated human rights into 
professional practice. Tasioulas (in press) has argued that two particular 
internal pressures have led to a corrosion of the idea of human rights in IHRL. 
Firstly, he notes the tendency, already discussed, for human rights law to 
identify human rights with human values or interests. This lack of clarity in IHRL 
might have caused the confusion between interests and human rights that have 
been reproduced in clinical psychology. A second way in which IHRL strays 
from its formative aim to give rigorous effect to a background of human rights 
morality is the overenthusiasm towards legalisation and judicialisation. 
Tasioulas (in press) reminds us that IHRL is only one among various 
mechanisms, legal and non-legal, for realising human rights morality. This 
tendency towards the institutional embodiment of human rights norms may 
account for the movement’s lack of sustained engagement with a mobilised 
citizenship that it crucial for realising human rights (Younis, 2018), and the 
notion that it is an alien ideology imposed on non-western societies (Matua, 
2002). This may have had the effect that human rights are considered the 
domain of legal and political process, divorced from the everyday practice of 
clinical psychology.  
 
Another aspect of clinical psychology that has influenced its adoption of human 
rights has been the influence of science. The triumphal progress of the natural 
sciences led to a scientism that promoted a belief that “their methods were the 
only methods for securing useful or reliable knowledge about anything” 
(Danziger, 1990, p. 41). However, the disciplinary arrangements in American 
universities set the conditions for the emergence of a scientific psychology. 
Danziger (1990) has demonstrated that science had taken over from religious 
authority in American universities during the late 19th century. Wundt’s 
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conception of psychology, connected with philosophy, linguistics and 
anthropology, slowly gave way to the practice of psychology that was more 
aligned with the natural sciences (Danziger, 1990). The extent to which 
developments in American clinical psychology directly influenced the profession 
of British clinical psychology is unclear (Hall et al., 2015). However, the Boulder 
conference established the scientist-practitioner model of training that had a 
profound influence on how the profession understands its fundamental 
orientation (Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992). Eysenck (1949), whose views influenced 
the training of clinical psychologists in the UK, disagreed about many of the 
methods in the American programmes except for the belief that it should be 
predicated on science. The challenge for a profession that defines itself in 
relation to scientific methodology is about its purpose. Earp (2011) has argued 
that science cannot determine human values. Drawing on David Hume’s 
argument for the gap between facts and values, Earp (2011) noted that science 
can describe nature and explain these descriptions by reference to general laws 
and patterns. However, it cannot determine questions that necessitate moral 
reasoning such as determining the best way to live or whether an action is good 
or bad. These normative questions fall outside the domain of objective empirical 
research and practice. Therefore, the morality of human rights may always 
occupy an uneasy position in clinical psychology so long as the scientific self-
image of the discipline continues to dominate.   
 
4.2.2. Meso-Level  
Also relevant to understanding clinical psychology’s troubled relationship with 
human rights are the tensions within domestic law. Before the introduction of 
community care in the 1950s, clinical psychologists often worked in mental 
institutions with residents under the control of the 1907 Mental Deficiency Act 
and the 1930 Mental Treatment Act (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2003). However, not 
until the 1959 Mental Health Act was it possible to discern rights in the form of 
voluntary admission (Kelly, 2015). The powers afforded to psychiatry under the 
1959 Mental Health Act can be understood in terms of the medicalisation of 
social control rather than the promotion of human rights (Rose, 1985b). Rose 
(1985b) has argued that the Mental Health Act 1983 was the culmination 
of a reforming campaign which was couched in terms of human rights. He 
argued that MIND, led by its Legal Director Larry Gostin, produced voluminous  
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publications, and evidence to official committees and the courts, arguing that 
the treatment of those diagnosed as mentally ill were an abuse or denial of their 
human rights. This may have been one reason for the specific reference to 
human rights in the professional guidelines in 1983. The fact that these 
references were not developed is perhaps indicative of the paucity of discussion 
relating to human rights in public discourse prior to the Human Rights Act 1998. 
Although reforms to the Mental Health Act in 1983 and 2007 often mentioned 
human rights there remained concerns that legally enforceable coercion 
undermined key human rights principles of liberty, autonomy and self-
determination (May, Hartley & Knight, 2003). Bindman, Maingay and Szmukler 
(2003) have argued that mental health legislation specifically discriminates 
against people with mental health difficulties. In particular, Kelly (2014) has 
argued that the legal framework for coercion contravenes the core principles of 
the CRPD. There are no easy answers and others maintain that interpreting the 
CRPD as precluding any involuntary intervention for people with disabilities 
would not offer sufficient protection for patients (Appelbaum, 2019).  
 
As statutory employees, under the 1998 HRA, all NHS staff have a legal duty to 
uphold the rights of everyone in their care. What does this mean when our 
domestic laws may not uphold the human rights of those with mental health 
difficulties? The contradictions and complex relationship between domestic and 
international law can leave professions regulated by those laws in a difficult 
position. Clinical psychology has grown as a profession alongside possibly 
irresolvable conflicts about the scope of choice, protection and coercion in 
mental health. It is perhaps no wonder than in the midst of this ethical 
controversy and political difference that the profession has also neglected core 
concerns of human rights.  
 
In this context the Beveridge Report of 1942 and the NHS Act of 1946 
established the world’s largest publicly funded healthcare system (Weait, 2013). 
The NHS both constrained and facilitated the development of clinical 
psychology (Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992), and the same can be said about the 
impact it may have had on human rights in the profession. In many ways the 
right to health, enshrined in Articles 25 of the UDHR and 12 of the ICESCR, is 
largely fulfilled by the NHS because of the provision of free health care (Weait, 
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2013). However, this research has questioned the particular model of mental 
healthcare promoted in the NHS. Firstly, there has been a relative neglect of 
psychosocial and public mental health intervention in the NHS (Kinderman, 
2014). As the profession was still developing, the occupational priorities for the 
majority of clinical psychologists related to the assessment of individual 
differences in the tradition of Francis Galton and the application of the scientific 
method to the practice of psychiatry (Dabbs, 1972). There were a number of 
calls for a more socially-oriented profession (Durndell, 1977; Michie; 1981, 
Smail, 1982), but possibly the lack of evidence of efficacy combined with the 
institutional structures of the NHS have precluded their realisation.  
 
The relationship between economic policy also influenced the development of 
clinical psychology in the UK. Rapid economic growth after the economic 
shocks from the world wars began to stagnate in the early 1970s (Piketty, 
2014). This period in the UK was notable for a stalled economy and rising prices 
which cleared the way for a new government (Chang, 2014). Margaret Thatcher 
came to power in 1979 and key policies in her government led to an 
unprecedented rise in inequality (Atkinson, 2015). While caution should be used 
when positing neoliberalism as an all-encompassing explanation and critique 
(Rose, 2019), the policies of that period are often distinguished by their 
neoliberal ideology (Atkinson, 2015). Progressive income taxes were lowered, 
the welfare state was reduced and the power of trade unions was undermined. 
It is unsurprising in this context why reports that stressed the socially 
determined dimension of health difficulties, like the Black Report, were 
suppressed. Instead, value was increasingly given to the enterprising individual 
who related to themselves against markers of autonomy, fulfilment, 
responsibility and individual choice (Rose, 1999). Increasingly competitive and 
insecure workplaces caused people to feel fearful and isolated leading people 
to blame themselves for perceived shortcomings (Smail, 1993). However, 
clinical encounters focused on the individual and intrapsychic sphere, avoiding 
any exploration of the impress of ideological and economic power (Smail, 
2005). Clinical psychology avoided the social context as this was the prevailing 
ideology at a crucial period in its development. The shift from the focus on 
states protecting their citizens to increasing hostility towards welfare and 
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dependency laid a framework for the erosion of human rights in society that was 
mirrored in clinical psychology.  
 
4.2.3. Micro-Level 
This section explores how internal pressures in the profession of clinical 
psychology have potentially contributed to the marginalisation of human rights 
in theory and practice. The first aspect concerns the aspirations of the emerging 
profession. Pilgrim and Treacher (1992) argued that clinical psychology has 
always sought legitimacy by being useful to society through the application of 
science. Hall (2007) has shown how effectively the CPP (MH) organised around 
the emerging structures of the NHS and actively sought a role for the new 
profession. One of the challenges centres around the profession’s primary 
mode of legitimacy being through the state and its institutions. It remains 
possible that the profession’s proximity with state-sanctioned institutions has 
meant that it has not been able to challenge the laws, policies and practices of 
the state. In addition, Smail (2005) argued that although clinical psychology has 
often been at pains to promote itself as objective and disinterested that its 
science is thoroughly bound up with interests. He maintained that the interests 
of the clinician in maintaining their livelihood meant that certain questions were 
asked in research, and particular conclusions highlighted, at the expense of 
alternative hypotheses. Under these conditions moral argument and praxis can 
become co-opted in the interests of power and maintaining the status quo 
(Smail, 2005). He went further and argued that clinical psychology maintained 
itself largely through its resolute refusal to countenance the socio-political 
dimension of distress. These processes can be seen to play out in some of the 
ethical guidance. The first code of conduct for psychologists stated that 
“criticism of the profession conduct of a Member of the British Psychological 
Society should never be made publicly, but through the Council of the Society” 
(BPS, 1955, p. 18). Such institutional processes can actually serve to protect 
perpetrators of abuse (Pilgrim, 2011), which reflects the wider tendency towards 
the protection of its membership rather than the public.  
 
A salient feature of clinical psychology has not only been its ambivalence in 
relation to human rights morality but also an uncertainty about its purpose and 
aims. Barry Richards argued in 1977 that “clinical psychology is a range of 
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heterogenous and often conflicting tendencies, reflecting, as it must, conflicts 
within psychology and ultimately within society as a whole” (as cited in Pilgrim & 
Treacher, 1992, p. 99). He continues to question whether there is dominant 
ideology in the profession beyond attempts to minimise dissensus. This 
seeming resolution, or compromise, led to the eclecticism that is common to 
clinical psychology practice. Pilgrim and Patel (2015) argued that these 
divergences of opinion are almost inevitable given that clinical psychology 
exists in ambiguous spaces between a range of disciplines with differing 
epistemology and ontological assumptions. This ambiguity also reflects clinical 
psychology’s rightful roles with respect to direct and indirect modes of 
intervention: “Some practitioners are of the view that the professional should 
focus on direct patient care, whilst others are convinced that maximum effect is 
to be achieved by seeking to influence the environment, organisation and 
management of health services” (MAS, p. 95). These professional tensions 
between treating the individual and the environment will not be resolved easily 
because, of course, both are needed. Human rights should be seen as an 
integral part of both direct patient care and efforts to influence the environment 
around people.  
 
4.3. Implications of Engaging with Human Rights 
 
It has been established earlier that clinical psychology’s avowed purpose of 
alleviating distress and promoting wellbeing is consistent with the aims of 
human rights to secure liberty, freedom and equality (Patel, 2007). For clinical 
psychology to engage more fully with the promotion and protection of human 
rights it must connect with other professions, agencies, networks and survivors 
towards these aims (Patel, 2011). This section outlines possible strategies and 
challenges of human rights-based approaches to clinical psychology.  
  
4.3.1. Training  
An immediate concern in relation to clinical psychology training and human 
rights is the continued lack of ethnic and socioeconomic diversity of clinical 
psychology training candidates (Daiches, 2010; Newnes, 2014). An important 
consequence of this lack of ‘representation’ in the profession is the continued 
perception that the psy-disciplines cannot work towards equality and non-
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discrimination (Patel & Keval, 2018). Training courses should recognise that 
inequalities in access to the profession relate to the denial of human rights in 
relation ethnicity, gender, age and other marginalised social locations that 
people occupy. This necessitates understanding the complex interaction 
between ethnicity and social disadvantage such as employment, poverty and 
socio-economic status and coordinated efforts to address these issues.   
 
There a small number of training clinical psychology training courses in the UK 
that have sustained teaching on human rights (Greenhill & Golding, 2018; Wood 
& Patel, 2017). The University of Liverpool have incorporated human rights into 
training. The elements include value-based selection procedures, the co-
production of content and delivery of teaching through experts by experience 
and sessions that encourage trainees to take a critical stance towards the 
history of the profession (Greenhill & Golding, 2018). The course also includes 
sessions on the history, core concepts, instruments and institutions relating to 
human rights. UEL have teaching on human rights and address the impact of 
inequalities in relation to race, culture and ethnicity (Patel et al., 2000). 
However, courses also need to consider how to move beyond the professions’ 
tendency to pay lip service to progressive social ideas (Patel, 2007). For 
example, critical teaching does not necessarily lead to students being less 
discriminated against (Adetimole, Afuape & Vara, 2005). Therefore, it is 
necessary to question and challenge the impact that teaching and training has 
on the experiences of other trainees and service users.  
 
Patel (2003) has also argued that the professional tendency towards 
understanding client’s lives and appreciating the impact of social inequality 
without demanding that psychologists critically look at how their own practice 
contributes towards further marginalisation. Therefore, training programmes 
could also invite trainees to move beyond vague appeals to dignity, human 
rights and equality and critically analyse the scope of their own obligations, as 
professionals and citizens, towards realising those human rights. Such a critical 
analysis may involve questioning the role of justice in mental health which is 
often spoken about in clinical psychology but can have a number of different 
meanings (Patel, 2011). Such an approach would interrogate the moral 
underpinnings of the profession more deeply and question the normative 
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assumptions of clinical psychology and the underlying theories of morality, mind 
and personhood that they imply.  
 
4.3.2. Practice 
The clinical psychology guidance documents emphasise the importance of 
recognising the context of distress but provide few insights into the role of 
clinical psychology in addressing that social context. Patel (2011) argues that 
taking our responsibilities seriously, in this regard, would necessitate redefining 
the role of mental health professionals as having both individual and social 
responsibilities. At the level of individual practice, psychologists have an ethical 
obligation to remain up to date with practice and developments in broader social 
and political contexts (BPS, 2017). Such an approach acknowledges the 
importance of confidentiality, consent and capacity but also questions what 
ethical and legal considerations those narrow parameters exclude. It might also 
entail an acknowledgment of the violations of people’s human rights in areas 
such as poverty, employment, housing or violence. Patel and Pilgrim (2018) 
provide a useful framework for clinical psychologists to work with individuals 
who report human rights violations. Drawing on this work, a critical realist 
approach to assessment and formulation might recognise the ontological 
dimension of what happened and the epistemic dimension of how those events 
are recollected and made sense of by individuals. This framework recognises 
that human beings are both determined and determining and that the 
experience of adversity relates to both inner and outer realities (Pilgrim, 2014a).  
 
Butchard and Greenhill (2015) maintain that human rights frameworks not only 
establish legal and ethical obligations towards individuals and their immediate 
systems but could also guide the development of more ethically oriented 
institutions. Patel (in press) has argued that psychologists should provide 
mechanisms to address the social determinants of health, monitor 
discrimination and disparities in access to healthcare and identify the most 
marginalised in society. Services should be more visible and establish 
partnerships with diverse communities to improve accessibility. This could 
improve knowledge about local communities’ cultural frameworks and lived 
experiences (Weatherhead & Daiches, 2010), break unhelpful stereotypes 
(Keating & Robertson, 2004) and provide opportunities for co-production in 
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services (Roberts, Greenhill, Talbot & Cuzak, 2012). It may also involve 
promoting an understanding of how human rights may be at risk in particular 
services, adopting a service-level stance of non-neutrality against human rights 
violations and understanding how best to promote best practice around human 
rights in complex systems (Patel, in press).  
 
It would also require a shift from addressing individuals’ psychological health in 
institutions to a focus on social justice and broader socioeconomic conditions. 
This broader perspective is consistent with recent arguments to adopt a public 
health approach in clinical psychology (Harper, 2016; 2017b). However, social 
change risks becoming unsustainable if development is not facilitated at the 
structural level of policy and legislation (Afuape, Hughes & Patel, 2016). 
Therefore, the role of a clinical psychologist should also involve contributing to 
service, local, national and international policy to address their potential 
psychological impact on individuals. Although there is evidence to support 
mental health promotion and prevention (Knapp, McDaid & Parsonage, 2011; 
Newton, 2013), a great deal of prevention work takes place in zones of 
uncertainty (Radden, 2017). Given that psychology’s impact on influencing 
policy is often overstated (Walker, Speed & Taggart, 2018), clinical 
psychologists need to critically reflect on how best to achieve any ambitions in 
this domain. There are finite public resources and, therefore, there should be 
ongoing discussions about the proportion of a clinical psychologist’s time 
directed towards policy, with all the aims of primary prevention, compared with 
reliving the symptoms of those already experiencing mental distress. These are 
all necessary avenues to explore in the future as the profession continues to 
develop and adapt to the various dilemmas and challenges of society.    
 
4.3.3. Research 
Patel (in press) argues that the principles of human rights and the standard 
ethical procedures in psychological research are complementary and need 
integration throughout the research process. A human-rights based approach to 
research may involve looking beyond the sanctioned ethical parameters of 
research to consider genuine co-production and the wider effects of the 
knowledge produced from research (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2017). This may 
involve recognising the limitations of evidence-based practice (Harper, Gannon, 
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Kenneth & Robinson, 2013), overcoming the idea of scientists as neutral 
observers of phenomena (Patel, 2007), and treating the outcomes of research 
with care (Rose, 2019). Monitoring and accountability measures could help 
ensure the protection of human rights in all aspects of psychological research 
whether or not the research outcomes may benefit society (Patel, in press).  
 
The relationship between mental health and human rights is complex and 
demands more scientific scrutiny (Mann, Bradley & Sahakian, 2016). It is 
important for clinical psychologists to research the causal mechanisms in 
relation to human rights and mental health. One of the challenges with research 
is that there is significant disagreement about the constructs under 
investigation, and how best to investigate mental health and justice. One 
proposal is that clinical psychologists could develop methods of detailing the 
social patterning of distress that improves the questionable validity and 
reliability of psychiatric constructs (Harper, 2016). However, Pilgrim (2014a) 
points out the psychiatric hegemony remains because of its institutional status 
rather than the scientific credibility of its knowledge claims. It is unclear the 
extent to which acknowledging the importance of social context might help 
clinical psychology challenge, rather than further reinforce, the research agenda 
of psychiatric epidemiology in the future. Therefore, clinical psychologists trying 
to promote human rights should critically reflect on their relationship to 
diagnostic language, and whether they adopt, or distance themselves, from 
psychiatric categories. 
 
Human rights research and practice could be an area that unites the human 
sciences. What might a genuinely interdisciplinary approach to human rights 
look like that encourages collaborative research between academics from 
psychology, sociology, economics, political science and human geography? 
There are very real challenges to working across disciplines but also 
opportunities for a revitalised approach to articulating a sustained and enduring 
critique of the unjust distribution of resources in our society. Patel (2007) has 
argued that embedding human rights in clinical psychology raises tensions and 
dilemmas that cannot be resolved in language but in action. Clinical 
psychologists could lend their research skills to community organisations or 
carry out action research with those who have survived and endured human 
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rights violations (Patel, 2007). This is an area that clinical psychologists could 
support and campaign around. Working with colleagues from other disciplines, 
alongside service users and survivors, to promote human rights may also 




One key challenge of human rights-based approaches to clinical psychology 
might be that practitioners engage with the moral and ethical demands of 
human rights solely at a rhetorical or procedural level (Rose 1985b; 2019). As 
discussed previously, this is one of the dangers of approaches to human rights 
that could be characterised as overly legalistic. Rose (1985b) has argued that 
the dominance of rights discourse in contemporary liberal democracy sidesteps 
important ethical issues, by smuggling in an unquestioned morality about our 
obligations towards one another and just behaviour. This could be addressed by 
ensuring that human rights are subject to continued scrutiny and reflection. 
Therefore, it is important that human rights, and the moral dimensions of clinical 
practice more generally, provide the basis for critical engagement through the 
same mechanisms of training and supervision that support the development of 
all clinical psychologists. Rather than viewing human rights-based practice as a 
competency that is either established or consolidated, supervisory and 
academic contexts provide an opportunity for the continued development of 
moral imagination (Arpaly, 2005). In the context of human rights, this moral 
impulse would involve the acknowledgment, recognition and engagement with 
the painful reality that human rights violations have for people. Developing this 
sensitivity would require continued support from others, but is essential in order 
for professional engagement with human rights to move beyond formal 
measures and policies. 
 
A human rights-based approach to clinical psychology places mental health in 
the context of security, social justice, equity and non-discrimination (Patel, in 
press). It would highlight important ethical and legal questions that have been 
ignored in the profession for too long. However, the domains of goodness and 
justice are not exhausted by human rights (Donnelly, 2013). There are moral 
considerations beyond the scope of human rights that also have an important 
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bearing on the practice of clinical psychology. These may include important 
moral considerations such as charity, mercy or compassion (Tasioulas, 2012). 
A consequence of this argument is that even if all human rights were fulfilled 
serious deficits in health may still persist and, therefore, human rights should 
not be the sole consideration in promoting health (Tasioulas & Vayena, 2016). 
One of the dangers, then, of a human-rights based approach is that other 
considerations relevant to mental health get ignored or become incorrectly 
characterised as human-rights issues.  
 
Western models of psychopathology have increasingly organised responses to 
terrorist attacks, natural disasters and war (Summerfield, 2000). Another 
concern is that the theories and research of clinical psychologists can 
psychologise the political dimensions of human rights violations (Patel, 2011). 
Papadopoulos (2002) has argued that confusing moral and psychological 
discourses can mean that in order to express justified condemnation of moral 
atrocities professionals sometimes offer as proof the fact that people have been 
left traumatised, broken and damaged. This trauma discourse can position 
survivors of tragic events as victims in need of medical treatment (Fassin & 
Rechtman, 2009). These practices might reinforce a moral economy of trauma, 
such that our systems of support and advocacy only support those in medical 
need rather than addressing the socio-political causes of violations (Fassin & 
Rechtman, 2009). Papadopoulos (2007) has discussed that when people are 
exposed to adversity there is a tendency for professionals to become polarised, 
viewing them as either being resilient or psychologically damaged. While it is 
important not to neglect or underestimate human suffering, responses to 
adversity often entail resilience or even positive response (Papadopoulos, 
2007). These traumatised conceptualisations of people’s response to adversity 
neglect the systemic complexities of the way that events impact families, 




Flick (2009) has argued that the proliferation of quality criteria in qualitative 
research means that the researcher needs to justify which proposed set of 
criteria would be most suitable to meet the aims of the evaluation. The 
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framework that has been chosen to evaluate this research assesses the 
contribution, credibility and rigour of the research (Spencer & Ritchie, 2012). A 
final section on reflexivity will be added to the framework to further support the 
depth of the evaluation. These standards were chosen because they were 
proposed for assessing the quality of research specifically in mental health and 
psychotherapy. Secondly, the areas can be applied flexibly as guidelines rather 
than rigid criteria (Spencer & Ritchie, 2012), which is in keeping with the 
principles of qualitative research and critical realism.  
 
4.4.1. Contribution 
Spencer and Ritchie (2012) underline the importance of considering how 
research might be relevant to theory, practice, policy and individual’s lives. This 
study has contributed to knowledge in the profession by outlining some 
mechanisms that can account for clinical psychology’s ambivalent engagement 
with human rights over time. Previous studies have established equivalent 
values between clinical psychology and human rights (Kinderman, 2007; 
Butchard & Greenhill, 2015), or noted the challenges and possibilities of clinical 
psychology’s engagement with human rights (Patel, 2007; 2011). By focusing 
on possible explanatory mechanisms, this study outlines the steps that 
professionals could take to challenge the areas that undermine clinical 
psychology’s engagement with human rights. The three-tiered analysis affords a 
basis to address these challenges at different levels depending on people’s role 
in services and policy. A key insight, in this regard, has been the evidence of 
clinical psychologist’s willingness to engage with human rights. It, therefore, 
demonstrates that human rights have not been completely marginal to the 
profession. Although their role has not been coherently integrated, those 
historical precedents highlight their potential to be developed more fully in 
professional theory and practice. Identifying these moments in time, however 
narrow and precarious, can support arguments that call for a profession more 
oriented towards the concerns of morality, justice and human rights.  
 
Price and Martin (2018) have argued that an emerging area of study in critical 
realism has been an engagement with moral realism. This study has maintained 
that human rights are relevant to clinical psychologists because they have a 
moral reality beyond being merely legal conventions (Tasioulas, 2012). It has 
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been argued that human rights are important beyond being justiciable (Sen, 
2006), and that the moral foundations of human rights, grounded in universal 
human interests, connect to the moral foundations of clinical psychology. 
However, such an approach will not convince those who are sceptical about the 
possibility of rights-based approaches to mental health. For example, Rose 
(2019) is cautious about the potential of human rights, specifically the CRPD, to 
influence practice. He argues: 
 
that the best way to reduce such use [of involuntary and quasi-voluntary 
administration of medication] is by instilling best practice, rather than 
through legal measures that are often ‘honored in breach’ – that is to say, 
which may be on the books, but have limited effects in practice (p. 222).  
 
Rose is criticising a purely legalistic interpretation of rights in this passage. 
Therefore, it is not an argument against human rights but against a particular 
conception of human rights. There are a number of ongoing projects in mental 
health trusts to embed human rights best practice on intensive care units and 
award wards (N. Patel, personal communication, April 30, 2019).  Kinderman 
and Butler (2006) have argued that psychological theory can reduce this gap 
between practice and legislation. The arguments developed in this study 
recommend that recovering the moral foundations of human rights would serve 
as a guide to instilling best practice and developing services.  
 
4.4.2. Credibility 
Exploring credibility in qualitative research relates to the plausibility of the 
claims (Spencer & Ritchie, 2012). Key questions that should be addressed 
include considering the composition of the raw data and the interpretative 
accounts generated. Barbour (2018) has argued that qualitative research, 
although noted for its ability to develop thick descriptions of phenomena, can 
often appear quite thin. A central challenge at the collection stage of this study 
resulted in the raw data being less comprehensive than anticipated. Some of 
the documents in the BPS’s archive at the Wellcome Collection had not been 
catalogued. In developing the research question, histories of the profession had 
used particular collections that I incorrectly assumed would still be open to the 
public. This meant that the analysis used fewer primary sources to generate 
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explanations than initially designed. An initial hope was to include some 
discussion of the minutes from the meetings of the CPP (MH) at the beginning 
of the NHS. Having these documents would have added a richness to the 
discussion of the professional interests of the society. Having said this, the data 
that was collected spanned a significant time period, from 1950 to 2018, which 
allowed a detailed analysis to be carried out.  
 
Bowen (2009) has suggested that documentary researchers should also draw 
on multiple sources of evidence, in the forms of participant interviews or 
ethnographic work. Forms of triangulation were used in the research to 
corroborate the findings. The BPS and DCP documents that were used 
predominantly in the analysis were compared against human rights instruments 
and mechanisms to understand the convergences and divergences. However, 
further studies could employ multiple and creative sources of data to further 
improve the credibility of the findings. An example might include using more 
specific document collection alongside ethnographic field work and interviews to 
explore the success of implementing human rights in mental health settings.  
 
The analysis included extracts of raw data to support the findings. The raw data 
was fully coded and refined to form the themes discussed in the analysis. Flick 
(2010) has acknowledged that a key challenge for qualitative researchers is that 
the themes constructed from the data could be subject to a process of selective 
plausibilisation. He maintains that it is often unclear how researchers manage 
passages that they believe do not illustrate, or diverge, from the content of 
themes. One of the key features of the analysis was the tension evident in the 
themes. The first theme (“The Right Language”) did diverge from the other 
themes because it was the only occasion when there was a sustained 
exploration of human rights. Although the themes were discussed with my 
supervisor, the analysis would have been supported by asking another 
researcher to validate the themes.  
 
4.4.3. Rigour 
Spencer and Ritchie (2012) argue that rigour might seem incongruous with the 
exploratory aims of qualitative research but highlight the importance of having a 
transparent research process, a defensible design and thorough conduct. To 
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ensure transparency I have included a sample extract of the raw data (Appendix 
D), and provided extracts of data to support the analytic findings. The second 
chapter defended the epistemological, ontological and methodological 
commitments of the research. An important consideration, in this respect, is that 
the methods used were the most appropriate way to answer the research 
questions. My supervisor and I considered the possibility of conducting 
interviews and focus groups. Although we thought that such a research strategy 
could answer the research question about the relationship between human 
rights and clinical psychology, we decided that it would leave the second 
question about the historical antecedents that could explain such a relationship. 
Having rich data to answer this second research question was crucial to 
appreciating the implications for the profession of engaging more with human 
rights.  
 
Rigorous research also involves giving thorough considerations to ethical issues 
(Spencer & Ritchie, 2012), and the exploratory nature of qualitative research 
demands an ongoing ethical sensitivity to what is constructed through the 
analytic process (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2017). Brinkmann and Kvale (2017) 
warned of research being co-opted by those with different agendas to the 
researcher. A key concern is that critical approaches to research can be 
considered to cast a suspicious interpretation over the relevant research 
material (Willig, 2017). This research has described the tensions and 
contradictions in both human rights and clinical psychology and could be used 
to undermine efforts to achieve the realisation of human rights for all people. 
However, critique also functions to question professional activity in ways that 
open up new avenues for exploration and practice. There is always a danger of 
research being misread and misunderstood and it is hoped that the 
dissemination of this work will continue a critical conversation about the values 
and goals of clinical psychology in relation to society.  
 
4.4.4. Reflexivity   
I discussed in the second chapter how my values informed the development of 
the research questions and design of the study. This section will explore how 
my learning throughout this process might be taken forward in my career. The 
opportunity to carry out this research has encouraged me to continue exploring 
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the relationship between justice, equality and human rights. I believe this is 
important because there is a growing awareness of how these concepts bear on 
our mental health and life more generally. There appears to be a more 
sustained discussion about the relationship between various forms of adversity 
and mental health. I appreciate more deeply than I did at the beginning of this 
project how these complex moral questions will demand sustained scrutiny over 
the course of my professional and personal life. I have already spoken about 
the dangers of psychologising human rights violations, but it is also important to 
not seek to explain individual psychological phenomena exclusively by 
reference to social structures (Fryer, 1994). I believe that psychologists can 
support individuals and organisations to make sense of the complex way that 
we experience events and phenomena through a complex interaction of 
intrapsychic, interpersonal, socio-political and epistemological factors. However, 
I also recognise the dangers of overemphasising how I might be able to 
contribute towards the preventative work that was outlined earlier in this 
chapter. Psychology offers a culturally dominant way of understanding this 
relationship but, again, the danger here is that this approach risks ignoring the 
intellectual resources from other traditions. It will be important for me to find a 
role as a clinical psychologist where I continue these conversations with 
colleagues and continue to develop these ideas in different contexts.  
 
I was also alerted to a bias that I need to be more mindful of during my career. 
As discussed, human rights and clinical psychology have been criticised for 
offering a Eurocentric and patriarchal perspective on human relationships. 
However, I do not think that I have adequately considered my own social 
identity as a white, middle class man during this research. When reviewing the 
final draft of my thesis, my supervisor noticed that the literature I used to form 
the basis of my arguments was dominated by white men (N. Patel, personal 
communication, May 3, 2019). We discussed how this bias might relate to my 
identity and that it had created a particular vision of human rights and clinical 
psychology. Following that conversation, I felt both gratitude that my supervisor 
had told me about these omissions but also a sense of loss and discomfort. I 
thought that this blind spot had potentially cut me off from perspectives that 
could not only have informed this study, but also my professional practice and 
outlook on life. I wondered how much of my approach to scholarship and 
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reading has been influenced by this pattern and am determined to change it in 
future in order to connect with fuller perspectives on human life and 
relationships. These conversations also made me reflect on the uncomfortable 
fact that although I had spoken about the importance of non-discriminatory 
practice my own work reflected and reproduced dominant forms of whiteness 
and masculinity that operate in society (e.g., Patel & Keval, 2018; Wetherell and 
Edley, 1999; Wood & Patel, 2017). The doctoral training has made me aware 
that being a white, middle class male affords me certain epistemic privileges 
(Fricker, 2007), such that my views may be given an overdue credibility in virtue 
of my social position. However, these conversations have made me recognise 
how wide the gap can be between awareness and action, between knowledge 
and virtue. In my future work I need to ensure that I pay attention to how my 
identity influences my approach to an area of research or clinical practice and 
how my opinions might be heard, possibly at the expense of others in society. 
 
4.4.5. Further Research 
There are several ways of building on this research that would clarify clinical 
psychology’s relationship with human rights in more detail. One avenue to 
explore in future work could be to carry out individual interviews and focus 
groups to explore the profession’s relationship with human rights. The research 
questions could still focus on clinical psychology as a whole and explore the 
views of those drafting documents for the guidance of clinical psychologists. 
This process would highlight some of the dilemmas and compromises that 
inevitably happen when writing guidelines for professional practice with a 
number of people who might have different philosophical convictions. Research 
questions that aimed to elucidate particular areas of clinical psychology could 
focus on particular specialities where perhaps human rights-based thinking and 
practice is more established. An example of this might be in learning disabilities 
service where research could explore how clinical psychologists understand 
their moral responsibilities in light of the scandals at Winterbourne View and, 
more recently, Whorlton Hall. A final avenue for research could be the way in 
which particular therapeutic modalities, either Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, 
Psychoanalysis or Systemic Therapy, have responded to human rights 
violations and some of the implications that their assumptions about human 
nature might have for incorporating these issues into therapy.  
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4.5. Concluding Comment 
 
This study has deepened my ethical awareness with respect to my professional 
and personal life. I am not sure whether a new clinical psychology oriented 
towards the moral concerns of human rights is possible. The history of the 
profession and current trends in our society guard against such untimely 
optimism. I believe that we should move away from any idealism associated 
with grand narratives of change (Afuape, 2011), but remain hopeful that practice 
can be challenged in local contexts in ways that might have wider impacts on 
people’s lives and social practices. I hope that I can find opportunities to 
continue developing these concerns with colleagues, supervisors and, of 
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Appendix A  
 
Table A  
Dataset of 31 Documents Relating to the Practice of Clinical Psychology for 
Initial Coding and Development of Themes 
Publisher Date Title  
British Psychological 
Society, Australian Branch 1950 
Sub-Committee on Professional 
Problems of Psychologists 
British Psychological 
Society 1955 
Standards of Professional Conduct of 
the British Psychological Society 
British Psychological 
Society  1985 A Code of Conduct for Psychologists 
British Psychological 
Society 1993 A Code of Conduct for Psychologists 
British Psychological 
Society 2006 Code of Ethics and Conduct 
British Psychological 
Society 2009 Code of Ethics and Conduct 
British Psychological 
Society 2018 Code of Ethics and Conduct 
British Psychological 
Society 1977 








Revised Ethical Principles for 
Research with Human Participants 
British Psychological 
Society 1992 
Ethical Principles for Conducting 
Research with Human Participants 
British Psychological 
Society 2010 Code of Human Research Ethics 
British Psychological 




Society 2007 Working Psychologically in Teams 
British Psychological 
Society 2016 
Guidelines for Psychologists on 
Disclosures of Historical Sexual Abuse 
British Psychological 
Society 2017 Practice Guidelines, Third Edition 
The English Division of 
Professional Psychologists 1960 
Rules of the English Division of 
Professional Psychologists 
The Scottish Division of 
Professional Psychologists 1960 
Rules of the Scottish Division of 
Professional Psychologists 
Division of Clinical 
Psychology  1973 
Interim Guidelines for the Practice of 
Clinical Psychology 
Division of Clinical 
Psychology 1974 
Current Guidelines for the Professional 
Practice of Clinical Psychologists 
Division of Clinical 
Psychology 1983 
The Professional Practice of Clinical 
Psychology 
Division of Clinical 
Psychology 1990 
Guidelines for the Professional 
Practice of Clinical Psychology 
Division of Clinical 
Psychology 1995 Professional Practice Guidelines 
Division of Clinical 
Psychology  1994 
Core Purpose and Philosophy of the 
Profession 
Division of Clinical 
Psychology 2001 
The Core Purpose and Philosophy of 
the Profession 
Division of Clinical 
Psychology 2010 
The Core Purpose and Philosophy of 
the Profession 
Division of Clinical 
Psychology 2015 Inclusivity Strategy  
Management Advisory 
Service  1989 Review of Clinical Psychology 
The Health Professions 
Council 2003 
Your Duties as a Registrant: Standards 
of Performance, Conduct and Ethics 
The Health Professions 
Council 2008 
Standards of Conduct Performance 
and Ethics 
Health and Care 
Professions Council 2009 







Final Dataset of 15 Documents Relating to the Practice of Clinical Psychology 
Included in the Analysis  
Publisher Date Title  
British Psychological Society 1955 
Standards of Professional Conduct of 
the British Psychological Society 
British Psychological Society  1985 A Code of Conduct for Psychologists 
British Psychological Society 1978 
Ethical Principles for Research with 
Human Subjects 
British Psychological Society 2007 Working Psychologically in Teams 
British Psychological Society 2017 Practice Guidelines, Third Edition 
The English Division of 
Professional Psychologists 1960 
Rules of the English Division of 
Professional Psychologists 
The Scottish Division of 
Professional Psychologists 1960 
Rules of the Scottish Division of 
Professional Psychologists 
Division of Clinical 
Psychology 1974 
Current Guidelines for the 
Professional Practice of Clinical 
Psychologists 
Division of Clinical 
Psychology 1983 
The Professional Practice of Clinical 
Psychology 
Division of Clinical 
Psychology 1990 
Guidelines for the Professional 
Practice of Clinical Psychology 
Division of Clinical 
Psychology 1995 Professional Practice Guidelines 
Division of Clinical 
Psychology  1994 
Core Purpose and Philosophy of the 
Profession 
Division of Clinical 
Psychology 2001 
The Core Purpose and Philosophy of 
the Profession 
Division of Clinical 
Psychology 2010 
The Core Purpose and 
Philosophy of the Profession 
Management Advisory 







The Initial Codes that Formed the Basis of the Broader Themes Explored in the 
Analysis 
Initial coding  
Clinical psychology and well-being 
Elements of well-being  
Clinical psychology and distress 
Reputation of profession paramount 
Clinical psychologists as unique in a competitive market place 
Applied psychology to solve human problems 
The notion of psychological expertise  
Clinical psychology as a science 
Psychologists have specialist psychological knowledge 
The important of competence  
Psychologists responsible for their fitness to practice  
Transferable skills 
The relationship between qualifications, competence and public trust  
Rights discussed more important in the supervisory relationship  
Rights more often invoked in terms of trainees and organisations than for 
patients 
 
The profession of clinical psychology  
Secrecy  
The importance of being effective 
Relationships important for securing rights  
Questioning the purpose of clinical psychology 
Psychologists as providers a psychological service  
Defined roles in healthcare - practitioners, patient, referral, service etc. 
Definition of clinical psychologist  
Clinical psychology and the individual 
Narrow scope of intervention 
116 
 
Clinical psychologists defined in quite limited terms 
Definition of clinical psychology – defining the scope of the profession 
Intervention and timescales  
Prevention discourses still in the remit of identified patient  
Clinical psychology and formulation 
Vagueness about the use of human rights 
Non-discrimination  
Monitoring by disaggregation 
Privacy 
Participation  
Right to Autonomy and Self Determination 
Security  
Effective remedy 
Cautious with respect to current knowledge  
Towards ethics-based practice 
Rapidly changing discipline 
Cautious in public pronouncements. 
Avoid being sensationalist or superficial 
Clinical psychologists as more than therapists  
Psychological health is influenced by context 
A wider focus  
Human rights explicitly mentioned  
Clinical psychology and action  
Positive duties 
Supervision as a mechanism for professional development  
Psychologists as leaders  
Psychologists responsible for developing mechanisms 
Psychologists as teachers and communicators  
Language of rights absent when useful 
Particular rights in focus more than others 
Work within limits of competence 
117 
 
Consulting with colleagues 
Decision making  
Primary concern is the patient 
Balance between the psychologist’s commitment to psychological science 
and human welfare  
 
Ethical dilemmas with respect to confidentiality 
Psychologists as responsible for creating environment for people to exercise 
their rights 
 
Psychologists aware of what might impact on rights being realised 
Power and the infringement of rights 
Power imbalance and equality  
Power and consent 
Capacity and consent  
The notion of informed consent – can it ever be truly valid? 
People under section do not have the rights to withdraw from treatment. 
Right to refuse treatment 
A history of deception – in experiments, trainee status  
Development of ethical norms - right to withdraw only when deception has 
been substantial? 
 
Recognition of harms in research  
Ethical principles as guidance 
Enforcement  
Clear recognition of legislation  
Legal responsibilities to avoid negligence 
Often a responsibility to be aware but is this also the case for the authors 
  
Narrow demographics in the profession 
Limits of a code  
The role of codes of conduct generally  
What is the structure and function of the mind?  








Figure B. A screenshot of an extract from the DCP Interim Guidelines for the 
Professional Practice of Clinical Psychology published in 1973 showing the 
coded raw data. 
